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Abstract
This essay offers an introduction to select disciplinary developments in the study of 
history and in historical study of the Hebrew Bible. It focuses first and foremost on 
“cultural history,” a broad category defined by nineteenth- and twentieth-century de-
velopments in anthropology and sociology, literary theory and linguistics, and other 
fields of study. The first part of the essay comments on developments since the so-
called “linguistic turn,” highlighting some key works on culture, narrative, and memo-
ry, in order to establish a contemporary historical approach to biblical studies. It then 
turns to questions of the Hebrew Bible’s usefulness for historical study, and highlights 
studies of King David and the Davidic polity in ancient Israel/Judah, to show how 
scholars of the Bible have done historical work in recent years. And finally, it provides 
a case study of the book of Joshua, demonstrating how historians can utilize biblical 
texts as sources for cultural history.
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 Introduction
Contemporary study of the Hebrew Bible rests upon methodological founda-
tions laid during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, methods 
that were “largely concerned with the history of the text and of the cultures 
that produced the texts” (Newsom 2010: 2227). In the “post-Enlightenment 
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mood of the emerging third millennium” (Nissinen 2009: 479), however, 
Hebrew Bible research has, to some extent, broken away from its histori-
cal foundations. A number of critical methodologies that are not historical 
per se have developed and thrived in recent decades, including various forms 
of ideological criticism, modern and postmodern literary criticisms, and even 
so-called postcritical perspectives. Yet many of these studies remain interested 
in history in one way or another; they remain devoted to issues concerning 
the past and its perceived differences, though they ask different sorts of ques-
tions than the historically inclined scholars of previous generations. And even 
those criticisms that self-identify as somehow non-historical have consistently 
identified themselves vis-à-vis historical criticism, their “mutual intellectual 
adversary” (Newsom 2009: 557; cf. Nandy 1997: 50). Thus, historical study re-
mains thoroughly in the mix, even as it becomes more and more diffuse within 
biblical studies generally, in the twenty-first century.
In our ongoing historical age, then, what are scholars saying about history 
and the Hebrew Bible? In recent decades, what have been some major trends 
in historical work in general, and how have these trends impacted biblical 
scholarship? Herein I offer an introduction to select disciplinary developments 
along with some thoughts of my own. I begin the essay with a discussion of 
some trends in the study of history, focusing mainly on what might be called 
“cultural history”: a broad and unwieldy category, the boundaries of which are 
fuzzily defined by nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments in anthro-
pology and sociology, literary theory and linguistics, along with other fields 
of study (Burke 2008). In this first part of my essay, I comment on several de-
velopments since the so-called “linguistic turn” in the late twentieth century, 
highlighting some key works on culture, narrative, and memory, in order to es-
tablish my own approach to biblical studies. The essay then turns, in its second 
part, to the Hebrew Bible and contemporary historical work in that field. What 
are some of the major debates of recent years, and what kind of work has de-
veloped from these debates? In my attempt to answer these questions, I focus 
first and foremost on the history of Israel’s early monarchy, on David and the 
Davidic polity, reviewing several recent scholarly efforts that exemplify cur-
rent biblical studies of this subject, and paying special attention to how these 
works relate to the aforementioned trends in historical inquiry. For David and 
his dynasty, there are trace amounts of extra-biblical evidence that can supple-
ment one’s discussion of Israel’s early monarchic period, and current historical 
scholarship has grown increasingly sophisticated in its understandings of the 
matrix of archaeological, epigraphic, and biblical data. For much of the Bible’s 
content, however, relevant historical data does not exist beyond the biblical 
narrative itself. What can one do, historically speaking, with regard to a text 
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like the book of Joshua or Judges, for example? I argue that cultural history, es-
pecially cultural history that delves into issues of narrative and social memory, 
is well suited for doing historical work with this kind of text.
Finally, in part three, therefore, I present a brief inquiry of my own concern-
ing the book of Joshua. My comments on Joshua do not attempt to solve any 
specific historical problem vis-à-vis this biblical book. Their goal, instead, is 
to demonstrate what a historically informed approach to this ancient Judean 
literary artifact might look like, today, in light of our lack of extra-biblical data 
to work with, and in light of the theoretical and methodological issues raised 
throughout the essay. In the end, my work here offers one take, a perspective as 
it were, on historical and biblical studies. It makes no claim to present a com-
prehensive overview of historical theory and method in general and Hebrew 
Bible studies in particular, if that were even possible. There are many schol-
arly issues and efforts that, unfortunately, I cannot address here. What fol-
lows is one scholar’s impression, so to speak, an indication of some important 
ways that history has been done in recent years, and how historical work has 
marked—and can continue to be important for—the study of biblical texts.
 Part 1: History and Culture, Narrative, Memory
All critiques of history from within the modern worldview have also been 
ultimately historical.
nandy 1997: 50
Over the course of the previous two hundred years, empiricism predominat-
ed over historical inquiry; it was the major theoretical and methodological 
foundation for the modern discipline of history (Green and Troup 1999: 1–11; 
Mazlish 2003). Attempting to recount the past objectively and neutrally, “how 
it actually happened” (wie es eigentlich gewesen),1 modern scholarship tended 
1   The famous phrase of German historian Leopold von Ranke, published in 1824, in the pref-
ace to his Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker (available, in the original 
German and in English translation, in the German History in Documents and Images [GHDI] 
collection, online: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id= 
358; accessed 7 June 2017). By famously claiming that he sought only to reveal the past wie es 
eigentlich gewesen, Ranke wanted to avoid making historical judgments; ostensibly, he was 
not interested in shaping present and future concerns. At least for late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century American historians, then, he was a “mythic hero … empirical science 
incarnate” (Novick 1988: 28). Still, Ranke believed history to be, in some way, “the working 
out of God’s will” (Green and Troup 1999: 2)—a belief revealed in the same book preface, 
where he claims that history writing should, ideally, “deal with humanity as it is, explicable or 
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to prefer histories that relied mainly, if not exclusively, upon the examination 
of primary sources of evidence. Within the dominant empiricist framework, 
history and its composition rested first and foremost upon the conviction that 
the past is a knowable reality, and that certain sources can provide observable 
and verifiable knowledge of that past reality.2
Bolstering this dominant framework was an understanding that empirical 
knowledge had somehow always been essential to “proper” historical thought. 
Although empiricism as such did not develop fully as an epistemology until 
the modern era, its principles—some would argue—were evident already in 
ancient, classical historical writing. Thucydides, for instance, who wrote in the 
late fifth century BCE, claimed to rely on what we might call empirical data in 
his History of the Peloponnesian War (e.g., 1.20–22), and so, in the early twen-
tieth century CE, the ancient Greek historian became something of an icon 
of professional historical (and even scientific) inquiry (e.g., Cochrane 1929). 
More recently, scholars have argued—and I agree—that Thucydides’ quasi-
empiricism was blown out of proportion in one way or another, thus diluting 
his import as a thinker and writer in his context and for our own (Workman 
2015; Forsdyke 2017). But the ancient historian’s occasional remarks on method 
nonetheless left their mark on the contemporary discipline of history, provid-
ing a classical justification for a modern empiricist approach. Empiricism thus 
stood, for much of the modern era, as the preferred theory of historical knowl-
edge, and investigation of empirical data—i.e., directly observable and verifi-
able documents and artifacts—served as the methodological benchmark for 
historical study.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the dominance of 
historical empiricism began to wane. To be sure, empirical evidence remained 
(and remains) a key component of historical method—one would be hard 
pressed to find a historian who denies the import of such evidence—but as 
an epistemology of history its stature has diminished on account of sustained 
inexplicable; the life of the individual, of generations, of nations; and, at times, with the hand 
of God above them.” How to understand Ranke’s religiosity and his interest in “the hand of 
God” in history is a point of debate in studies of his work (e.g., Braw 2007). On Ranke’s legacy 
in general, see Iggers and Powell 1990.
2   E.g., Arnaldo Momigliano (2016 [Italian original, 1975]), once wryly commented, “The histo-
rian works on the assumption that it is possible to reconstruct and understand the facts of 
the past. If an epistemologist succeeds in convincing him of the contrary, the historian will 
have to take up some other line of work” (40), and further, “All of a historian’s work is devoted 
to sources…. What ultimately makes a historian is the ability to read the document [i.e., a 
source] as if it were not a document, but an actual event of past life” (45).
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critique (Green and Troup 1999: 1; Mazlish 2003: 13; Clark 2004: 9–28).3 This 
critique stemmed largely from the so-called “linguistic turn” in the humanities 
(Rorty 1992), a turn more or less coterminous with structuralist and eventu-
ally poststructuralist and postmodernist thought.4 As Gabrielle Spiegel (2005) 
describes it, the linguistic turn refers to “the notion that language is the con-
stitutive agent of human consciousness and the social production of mean-
ing, and that our apprehension of the world, both past and present, arrives 
only through the lens of language’s precoded perceptions” (2). The notion 
that languages have inherent structures of meaning, and that these struc-
tures constitute our social, cultural, and historical experience, stems from the 
early twentieth-century works of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and 
American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce on sign systems or “semiotics” 
(Chandler 2007; Aichele 2016: 5–14). This notion has had a profound impact on 
the humanities generally and on understandings of history in particular. Very 
simply put, if language has inherent systems of meaning that construct reality, 
and not vice versa, then the concept of history as the real past—and as a me-
diation between reality past and present—becomes problematic. According 
to this line of thought, if taken to its most extreme possible outcome, history 
no longer deals with any real past, or with primary sources that provide some 
amount of present access to past reality; it deals with, instead, traces of lin-
guistic structures that are encountered via other, different linguistic structures. 
Indeed, from this point of view, there would be no such thing as a past real-
ity with connections to the present; in other words, “the idea of an objective 
3   This is not to say, however, that empiricism is dead in history. See, e.g., Jeremey Black (2015), 
a prolific British historian who deems empiricism and objectivity necessary to make history 
publically and politically relevant today.
4   Poststructuralist/postmodernist thinking, typically associated with the likes of Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and other French philosophes of the late twentieth century, has 
played a considerable role in historical study during the last fifty years or so, though most-
ly in discussions of theory and less so in methodological practice (Green and Troup 1999: 
297–307). Foucault has been especially influential (and controversial) among historians (see, 
e.g., O’Brien 1989; Goldstein 1994). That said, in this essay I do not discuss Foucault in detail, 
for several reasons. One is that, despite his undeniable impact on discussions of historical 
theory and historical subject matter, Foucault’s actual influence in the disciplinary work 
of history, even at the cutting-edge of such work, has been somewhat limited (Megill 1987; 
cf. Partner 2016: 47). In addition, as Kerwin Lee Klein (2011: 59–83) argues, for historians in 
North America at least, the advent of the linguistic turn and the reception of French post-
structuralism was primed already by developments in Anglophone anthropology, ethnogra-
phy, and philosophy. In my discussion below, therefore, I focus on other thinkers and their 
influences on history, but without denying the import of Foucault and likeminded scholars 
of his generation.
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universe existing independently of speech and universally comprehensible 
despite one’s membership in any particular language system is an illusion” 
(Spiegel 2005: 2).
Many current historians, while recognizing and even drawing on the in-
sights of the linguistic turn, have not followed the turn to its most drastic pos-
sible outcome. Historians, along with anthropologists, sociologists, and the 
like, have consistently tempered the more extreme possibilities of (post)struc-
tural linguistics and philosophy with an understanding that there are, in fact, 
historical actors with agency in actual social contexts. Language may construct 
our reality, at least to some extent, but we nonetheless consciously use and 
thus shape language structures within human society. Linguistic structures are 
not static, closed systems. They are dependent, in part, on their dynamic and 
ongoing usage among historical actors (cf. Spiegel 2005). This recognition has 
enabled the work of history to continue and even thrive, albeit in ways radi-
cally different from the work of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
empiricists, and in ways diverse as ever.
1 Cultural Theory and Fragmentation in History
The linguistic turn challenged the epistemological foundations of historical 
study in the modern era, but it also reoriented historical concerns. The issue of 
language’s relation to meaning-production is obviously relevant to many disci-
plines in the humanities and social sciences. And so the increased focus on this 
issue across the academy led to an increase in cross-disciplinary interaction 
and influence. Developments in the fields of anthropology and ethnography 
in particular—developments that had close ties to the linguistic turn’s intel-
lectual movements—have had a profound impact on the work of historians, 
and developments in historical theory, in turn, have shaped anthropological 
thought. Over the course of the twentieth century, many historians turned 
away from typical investigations of political regimes and revolutions, wars and 
“great men” and so on, and toward questions of culture. How and why humans 
interact and communicate, within and between societies, and what meanings 
are produced through such interactions—the kinds of questions also asked by 
field-working anthropologists—became major talking points in the discipline 
of history.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, especially in Anglophone con-
texts, the anthropological work that was most influential in the study of histo-
ry was Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures.5 The book, published in 
5   Other mid to late twentieth-century anthropologists had noteworthy impacts on historical 
study and should be mentioned here (e.g., Douglas 2002 [original, 1966]; Turner 1969; Sahlins 
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1973 and consisting mostly of essays composed in the 1960s, suggested a move 
toward reading cultures as texts, and texts as cultures. This move was depen-
dent, first and foremost, upon Geertz’s conceptualization of culture as semi-
otic, that is, as a symbolic system. For Geertz, culture is more than the things 
people make and use, more than the languages they speak, the institutions in 
which they work and serve and so on. Culture is the interrelated systems of 
meaning produced by those various aspects of human life, in a social setting. 
And the anthropologist’s job, according to Geertz, is to describe those systems 
of meaning. It is not enough to describe, say, a person in an expensive down-
town coffee shop using a laptop computer with a glowing piece of fruit on it (to 
imagine a situation an ethnographer might document today); a good anthro-
pologist will, instead, explicate how and why that person’s computer brand 
means something to different persons in that particular situation and time. 
The anthropologist thus reads and interprets the scene, as the literary critic 
similarly reads and interprets a written text. What might that little glowing 
apple communicate about socio-economic standing or the import of personal 
aesthetics, for instance, to onlookers in the coffee shop, and how might these 
communications influence social interactions at the shop? What meanings are 
there in this social scene, how might they relate to other, similar scenarios in 
the society, and how might all of this operate in concert to drive social life? 
Geertz called this ethnographic work “thick description” (1973: 3–30), a term 
he borrowed from philosopher Gilbert Ryle, and he demonstrated it perhaps 
most famously in an essay about cockfighting in Bali (1973: 412–53). In this 
kind of work, Geertz argued, the task is “to uncover the conceptual structures 
that inform our subjects’ acts … and to construct a system of analysis in whose 
terms what is generic to those structures, what belongs to them because they 
are what they are, will stand out against the other determinants of human 
behavior” (27).
This development in anthropological theory and method had considerable 
influence in the academy at large in the 1980s and later. Its influence was so 
widespread that Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (1999: 2–4), in an impor-
tant and widely read volume of essays, proclaimed Geertz’s Interpretation of 
Cultures as one of the two most influential books for the social sciences dur-
ing the closing decades of the twentieth century.6 For historians in particular, 
1985). But I emphasize Geertz above all, as an exemplar of this trend, because of his unde-
niably broad influence in history as well as in many other academic disciplines in North 
America.
6   The other being Hayden White’s Metahistory (1973), which I discuss below. Bonnell and Hunt 
were not alone in their proclamation. The American Sociological Association also included 
Geertz in its 1996 list of “ten most influential books of the past twenty-five years” (cited in 
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Interpretation of Cultures afforded a novel and productive approach to reading 
sources: following the ethnographic approach championed by Geertz, histo-
rians could interrogate their documents with an eye toward culture and cul-
tural systems in order to explicate past phenomena (Biersack 1989). Via Geertz, 
scholars found a way to examine afresh “who people think they are, what they 
think they are doing, and to what end they think they are doing it” in certain 
social-historical contexts (Geertz 2000: 16).
Geertz’s approach to cultural anthropology blended philosophical insights 
from linguistics with ethnographic considerations of actual social life. His 
work thus provided a new theoretical frame that was akin to the linguistic turn 
in general, but that also lent itself well to specific historical interests rooted 
in empirical data. Moreover, while culture—or at least the Geertzian under-
standing of it—was emerging as a viable and invigorating explanatory concept 
for history, a number of prominent Marxist historians, as well as adherents 
to the widely influential Annales “school,” were growing increasingly dissatis-
fied with the limitations of their own standard social-theoretical frameworks 
(Hunt 1989: 11–14; Spiegel 2005: 7–9).7 These growing theoretical dissatisfac-
tions among historians provided further impetus for taking up cultural theory 
in the 1980s and later.
For many, then, culture became the new preferred basis for historical 
analysis, pushing aside old standards like class, economy, government, and 
other bedrocks that had previously been foundational for inquiries in history. 
The rise of culture as theoretical key inspired historical luminaries such as 
Natalie Zemon Davis and Robert Darnton, each of whom collaborated with 
Geertz in Princeton (Biersack 1989: 76), and whose works emphasize expli-
cation of motivations and meanings in local and particular, “ordinary” social 
contexts of the past (e.g., Davis 1983; Darnton 1984). Concomitantly, as this 
newly found theoretical key made anthropology more textual and history 
more anthropological, it likewise made literary studies more historical. The 
new cultural history of the 1980s and 90s found something of a strange bedfel-
low in what came to be known as “New Historicism” in literary theory (Veeser 
1989; Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000)—with Stephen Greenblatt’s Marvelous 
Possessions (1992), a study of European colonialism via its representation in co-
lonialist anecdotes, standing as New Historicism’s parade example. The cultural 
Bonnell and Hunt 1999: 4). And Klein (2011) has quipped that “thick description became al-
most an academic bumper-sticker in the eighties” (64; italics in the original).
7   For overviews of Marxist and Annales histories, see Green and Troup 1999: 33–43 and 
87–97, respectively, with many additional references therein. On Marx’s legacy in history, 
see Adamson 2002. On the influence and eventual fragmentation of Annales as a coherent 
program or “paradigm” for history, see Hunt 1986; and Megill 2007: 190–202.
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history that emerged in the 1980s and thereafter and the New Historicist liter-
ary criticism are often mentioned in the same breath (e.g., Klein 2011: 85–86), 
and indeed their highest profile practitioners have frequently crossed paths 
and even collaborated directly.8 Thus, for a number of influential scholars in 
the late twentieth century, the boundary lines between traditional disciplines 
in the humanities and social sciences became increasingly blurry. As the new 
millennium approached, anthropologists were thinking more about texts, his-
torians wrote increasingly thick descriptions of past human moments, and 
scholars of literature were “[probing] the delicate semiosis of history, culture, 
and power” (Klancher 1989: 77).
In Hebrew Bible studies, the impact of these cross and interdisciplinary 
developments in cultural theory has been clearly visible. Steven Tuell (1992), 
for example, drew on Geertz’s cultural anthropology to illuminate a social 
setting for the temple vision in Ezek 40–48. Similarly, E. Theodore Mullen Jr. 
(1993) took an interpretive-cultural approach in his historical investigation of 
Deuteronomistic literature, relying on a range of works by prominent cultural 
theorists. And Amélie Kuhrt, in her widely read history of the ancient Near 
East (1995), emphasized the cultural function of biblical accounts of Israelite 
origins (437). The so-called New Historicism, too, with its pronounced interest 
in Geertzian interpretive-cultural theory, has been prominent in biblical stud-
ies since the 1990s (e.g., Rowlett 1996; Hens-Piazza 2002; George 2009). Indeed, 
in 1997 Biblical Interpretation devoted an entire issue to New Historicism and 
its various critical stances. In that journal, Robert Carroll (1997) called for a 
“cultural poetics” of the Hebrew Bible, one concerned with “the historicity of 
texts and the textuality of history” (301, citing Louis Montrose). Culture thus 
became a productive theoretical key for scholars interrogating the Bible for 
insights into ancient Israel and Judah, just as it did for scholars interrogating, 
for instance, literary and archival documents for insights into early modern 
European society.
As one might anticipate, however, debate emerged in the academy over 
the meaning of culture itself. In an essay seminal for historians, William H. 
8   An exemplar is the University of California Berkeley journal Representations, the editorial 
board of which has included new historicists, cultural historians, and symbolic anthropol-
ogists alike. See the Introduction in Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000, for an account of the 
journal’s beginnings and interests. That said, as my friend and colleague Andrew Gow has 
reminded me, it is important to note that not all cultural historians felt (or feel) comfortable 
associating with New Historicism. As its own disciplinary and methodological movement, 
New Historicism was reacting to and interacting with problems particular to the world of 
literary criticism. The interests of New Historicism thus frequently differ from the typical 
interests of historians (cf. Maza 2004).
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Sewell Jr. (1999), for example, sought to clarify the important distinction be-
tween “culture as theoretical category and culture as concrete and bounded 
body of beliefs and practices” (39). Concerning theory, Sewell maintained a 
basically semiotic understanding of culture—that is, culture refers to symbolic 
meaning-making in social life—but he also criticized a tendency to reduce cul-
ture to a static system inherent to human society (cf. Biersack 1989: 80). He 
argued for a semiotic theory of culture that nonetheless took seriously human 
practice and performance, how humans manufacture and employ meanings—
i.e., produce or construct culture—in a given social setting. “[T]he conception 
of culture as semiotic,” wrote Sewell:
implies a particular notion of cultural practice. To engage in cultural 
practice is to make use of a semiotic code to do something in the world. 
People who are members of a semiotic community are capable not only 
of recognizing statements made in a semiotic code … but of using the 
code as well, of putting it into practice. To use a code means to attach 
abstractly available symbols to concrete things or circumstances and 
thereby to posit something about them. I would also argue that to be able 
to use a code means more than being able to apply it mechanically in 
stereotyped situations—it also means having the ability to elaborate it, 
to modify or adapt its rules to novel circumstances.
SEWELL 1999: 51
This theoretical reformulation, he contended, would better enable historians 
to understand various human cultures (note the plural), their dynamic histo-
ries and interrelationships, “to discern what the shapes and consistencies of 
local meanings actually are and to determine how, why, and to what extent 
they hang together” (58).
In an essay complementary to Sewell’s, Richard Biernacki (1999) criti-
cized Geertzian cultural histories for tending to essentialize culture and 
for frequently sidelining or subverting other explanatory concepts that 
could readily contribute to our understandings of the construction of social 
reality.9 In doing so, he argued, such cultural historians inadvertently made 
9   This essentializing tendency was perhaps due to highly selective readings of Geertz. 
Biernacki (1999), for one, called out proponents of cultural history for “[overusing] bits of 
Clifford Geertz’s philosophical magic” and for “[accepting without argument] spellbinding 
features” of his work (63). Indeed, typical recitations of Geertz and Geertz’s influence on his-
tory mention his seminal essays in Interpretation of Cultures, as I myself have done above, but 
rarely engage his thoughts beyond that volume (one notable exception is Biersack 1989). Very 
seldom does one find references, for instance, to Geertz’s own attempt at historical inquiry, 
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the same reductionist move for which they criticized their social-historical 
predecessors—Marxist, Annaliste, and otherwise (cf. Megill 2007: 203–204). 
These kinds of critiques have led historians, in recent years, to supplement 
their focus on culture with additional attention to practice, performance, and 
human agency within various spheres of social life, in order to develop a more 
dynamic and multi-dimensional understanding of historical processes (cf. 
Ortner 1997: 6–11; Spiegel 2005: 22–26). An outstanding exemplar is Biernacki’s 
own work on nineteenth-century weaving mills in Britain and Germany, in 
which he shows how different measurement practices—represented in writ-
ten reports, posted on factory walls—effected different labor experiences for 
Negara (1980), which includes a short, introductory treatise on historical method, or to his 
later reflection on the interrelationship of anthropology and history (2000: 118–33; originally 
published in the journal New Literary History in 1990).
  Furthermore, the essentializing tendency gave the impression that history needed to be 
completely retooled in relation to culture; i.e., that history, as it were, was now obsolete and 
that something novel and cultural should arise in its place—hence the “new” historians, 
“new” historicisms, and so on. But this notion was (and is) largely unfounded. As Biernacki 
(1999) emphasized, Geertz had an “exhilarating agenda for studying how culture works” (63; 
italics in the original), and this agenda was not to be dismissed out of hand, by historians or 
anyone working in the social sciences or humanities for that matter. The problem historians 
faced was how to integrate Geertz’s agenda for studying culture into their own discipline, 
which—unlike Geertz’s primary task of ethnography—attends to the realities of, and expla-
nations for, past social contexts, not the recordable activities of contemporary ones. There 
is a fundamental tension between “looking back” (i.e., history) and “looking sideways” (i.e., 
anthropology), and between conceptions of self and other in each discipline, as Geertz him-
self has put it (2000: 120–21). And, despite numerous attempts, scholars have not been able 
to overcome this tension in any way that would suggest a new, coherent disciplinary forma-
tion. “[T]he conjoining of History and Anthropology is not a matter of fusing two academic 
fields into a new Something-or-Other, but of redefining them in terms of one another by 
managing their relations within the bounds of a particular study” (Geertz 2000: 127). The 
problem is, of course, noticeable in Geertz’s own historical work, in which he acknowledges 
and discusses some of the challenges of fusing disciplinary interests. In Negara, Geertz wants 
to lay groundwork for a cultural history of state formation in Indic-era (i.e., late first-/early 
second-millennium CE) Indonesia, broadly speaking, but is forced to base his study on eth-
nographic data from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Bali, because relevant information 
for earlier periods is simply too scattered, too fragmentary and ambiguous. With political 
theater and its cultural import as his foci, he uses recent Balinese data to formulate hypoth-
eses about earlier and broader sociocultural processes, in order to build a base model of the 
Balinese state from which one could make Weberian ideal-typical and other sorts of com-
parisons and tease out historical implications. His study, then, provides a blurry freeze-frame 
of an anthropological concept or, better, a constellation of concepts in relation to classical 
Indonesian polity, and in doing so it duly recognizes the challenges (perhaps even impossi-
bility) of detailed history-writing on this issue and era. It is an excellent example of how one 
can draw on both historical and anthropological interests to study and write about the past, 
but it did not inaugurate a new disciplinary standard or “paradigm” per se (see more below).
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the workers in each respective setting (2005: 236–39; cf. 1995: 41–92). In other 
words, although the cultural systems were comparable (accounts of cloth pro-
duction represented by written postings on factory walls), experience of the 
culture depended upon specific practices within each social setting. In this case 
at least, practice apparently informed culture, thus complicating any claim 
that an overarching cultural system was the primary meaning-maker within 
particular social contexts. This kind of work can be important for biblical stud-
ies too. For scholars of the Hebrew Bible who are interested in scribal culture in 
the ancient Near East, for example, Biernacki’s attention to practical differenc-
es is instructive. Different practices of writing in certain locales would contrib-
ute to the formation of significantly different scribal cultures across the region 
(cf. Hobson 2012).
Despite these constructive critiques in the 1990s and 2000s, the debates 
over culture have never really settled. History in the early twenty-first century 
is a discipline as fragmented and complex as ever. One might argue, as Lynn 
Hunt (2014) does in her recent survey of the field, that current historians face 
a paradigmatic crisis of sorts. Cultural theory, she contends, has successfully 
undermined the old schools of Marxism, modernization, Annales, and identity 
politics (13–19); but hopes for a new historical paradigm founded on culture 
never materialized (32–40). Therefore Hunt, previously a major champion 
of theory-inspired cultural history in the 1980s and 90s, now—once again—
calls for a new paradigm, one that takes into account both the general and 
the particular; the global, the local, and even the self. She wants histories that 
“[pay] attention to changing cultural contexts and the way they are shaped by 
individual wishes” (131), and prefers historical explanation that “combines psy-
chological and social, intra-European and global factors and that privileges no 
single one of them” (150). Hunt’s taking stock of the culture debates and their 
outcomes is insightful, and her call for a historical focus on selves and societies 
in light of globalization is timely.10 It is questionable, though, whether history 
is in need of a new paradigm, or paradigms at all for that matter (a question she 
recognizes, but dismisses; 40). The idea of a coherent, overarching paradigm 
perhaps works in relation to the natural sciences—although it has not been 
without controversy11—but in history it may well be counterproductive. To 
10   Cf. Ortner 1997: 7–8, with regard to globalization and anthropological work specifically; 
see also the collection of articles in History and Theory, Special Issue 54 (2015), which 
addresses the topic “History and Theory in a Global Frame.”
11   The concept of research paradigms and paradigm shifts, of course, comes from the 
work of Thomas Kuhn (1996 [original, 1962]), who had a tendency “[to coin] terms for 
speed-readers to abuse” (Geertz 1983: 152). On Kuhn’s impact see, e.g., Zammito 2004, also 
Gutting 2007.
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insist on a paradigm, as it were, would be to limit the critical process in history. 
Moreover, as one reviewer of Hunt points out, questioning the relationship 
between self and society has always been central to social and cultural theory, 
and thus it is doubtful that her suggested approach would constitute anything 
like a new paradigm (Moyn 2015: 30).
In these past few decades the emphasis on culture and the debates it has 
caused, I would argue, have greatly enriched the work of history, despite the 
resultant fragmentation and complexity in the discipline. Instead of somehow 
inhibiting history or, worse, fully disabling it, cultural theory has enlivened and 
advanced its study (cf. Bynum 2009: 75–77). Pace Hunt, rather than success-
fully undermining the older social-historical frameworks of Marxism, Annales, 
and so on, the retooling of culture has had, more often than not, a rehabilita-
tive effect in various realms of historical inquiry. It has allowed for and con-
tributed to, for example, Natalie Zernon Davis’s eloquent reexamination of 
the age-old debate over religion and capitalism’s interrelationship (1997), and 
Sheldon Pollock’s sweeping study of literary culture in India (2006); as well 
as, more recently, Aziz al-Azmeh’s thoroughgoing treatise of Islam’s historical 
emergence (2014)—among other brilliant works that seriously take into ac-
count various and dynamic historical conditions, be they political, ecological, 
psychological, cultural, or something other, to elucidate our knowledge of and 
thinking about things past.
For scholars of the Hebrew Bible, these developments in cultural theory and 
the resultant diffusion of historical concerns have opened up new avenues of 
thought that can help us move beyond the old and well-worn questions of our 
field. The focus on culture in history pushes us to ask not only how the Bible’s 
texts came together, but also why the complex compositions would have had 
meaning, and what kinds of meaning they would have had, in their ancient 
social contexts. It pushes us, too, to question our long-held assumptions about 
the relationships between social actors and activities in the ancient Near East. 
What “webs of significance” (Geertz 1973: 5) were spun between literati and 
politics, priests and economies, kings and theologies, and so on, in different 
contexts, and how do the texts speak to or reflect such systems of meaning?
Thus, I concur with Allen Megill (2007), who writes, “[P]art of the function 
of historical study is to shuffle the cards, showing the various ways in which 
the past is actually incoherent with itself and with our expectations of it, and 
also showing how the study of the past relies on conflicting modes of under-
standing and engagement” (207; cf. Eley 2005: 54). The current diffusion of 
approaches in history, created in large part by the impact of cultural theory in 
the aftermath of the linguistic turn, provides a fertile setting for new historical 
work in our era.
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2 Narrative in History
While the academy at large was turning toward questions of language and 
the construction of meaning through language, and history was develop-
ing a working interest in the concept of culture in relation to society, there 
was also a boom in discussions about narrative. It is widely regarded that 
narrative—and especially the act of narrativizing, of crafting and telling a 
story—is a key component of human thought. “[N]arrative … includes an en-
tire range of discourse that goes back to the earliest times. People have always 
told stories”; thus it is an “inexhaustible treasure” that discloses “deep connec-
tions to life, to other people, and to society as a whole,” as the philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur once stated in an interview about his work on the topic (in Dowling 
2011: 109). Telling stories—that is, crafting narratives—contributes to the con-
struction of both personal and group identities. We do it all the time. Indeed, 
the concept of identity construction itself may be defined as an ongoing pro-
cess of crafting and re-crafting narratives about ourselves in relation to others 
(cf. Bruner 1990: 111–16; Olick and Robbins 1998: 122). Narrative is thus ubiq-
uitous and inescapable in human life, and it is complex. The process of nar-
rativizing, of crafting a story, involves defining a beginning and end, ordering 
a chronology, choosing particular details to emphasize and deemphasize (or 
simply leave out), providing syllogistic reasoning of causation (i.e., giving it all 
a plot), and engaging a range of related ideas in the process. And this process 
is informed by both conscious and unconscious decisions made by the story-
teller (cf. Rigney 2013: 189).
Thinking in part about the construction of narrative, its various forms and 
complexities, the intellectual historian Hayden White wrote a monumental 
book called Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe. The book appeared in 1973—the same year as Clifford Geertz’s influ-
ential collection of essays on culture.12 In it, White did with history-writing—
i.e., historiography—something similar to what Geertz did with ethnography: 
he focused on the fact of writing and its inherent processes. Historiography, 
like ethnography, is composed by the scholar; the historian tells history, thus 
12   Below I focus almost exclusively on White as an exemplar of narrative theory’s influ-
ence in historical work (as I did with Geertz and cultural theory). But other important 
scholars should be noted here too, such as Frank Ankersmit, Hans Kellner, and Dominick 
LaCapra (see, e.g., Kramer 1989, on LaCapra as compared to White). The decision to focus 
mainly on White is practical—there is simply too much to say about this topic—but it 
is also on account of the fact that White’s work, like Geertz’s, has had a much broad-
er reach within the humanities than any of his comrades’ contributions. In addition, 
Ankersmit et al. would agree that White’s work is fundamental here (cf. Allan Megill, in 
Domańska 1998a: 4).
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constituting it and imbuing it with certain details and interests and concerns. 
History is always mediated, brought into the present via the mind and work of 
the scholar conveying it. Recognizing this, White was interested in examining 
how historians told their histories, and what the act of narrativizing history 
might say about historiographical discourse in general. In his study, he read sev-
eral prominent pieces of history-writing and philosophy from the nineteenth 
century (namely, works by Hegel, Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce) as sources for the thought patterns and narrative 
techniques of their authors. White’s study was thoroughly unconventional, for 
a historian. Instead of relying on standard methodological treatises from the 
field of history, for instance, he utilized theories of plot structure borrowed 
from the field of literary criticism.13 His approach was to examine historians’ 
preferred emplotments and modes of argumentation, their apparent world-
views as well as the ideological implications inherent in certain combinations 
of plot and argument, in order to reveal nineteenth-century preconceptions 
about historical reality (i.e., the “tropes” in which these authors thought about 
the past). The book has been called a “myth” and a “‘cult book’ of theory” 
(Domańska 1998b: 174). It is a kind of cultural history of history.
White’s analysis of nineteenth-century European historiography and philos-
ophy revealed a range of preconceptions about representing the past, in that 
era and place. He categorized these preconceptions into four separate tropes: 
Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony; and, despite his later claims to 
the contrary, he suggested that they informed a theory of historical thought 
and the writing of history (White 1973: 31–38).14 The first three tropes, White 
contends, remain at least somewhat committed to the idea that the historian 
can figuratively represent past realities; while the last (Irony) reverses this idea 
by presupposing that a reader or hearer of history will recognize “the prob-
lematical nature of language” and “the potential foolishness of all linguistic 
characterizations of reality” (White 1973: 37). In short, White states, “Metaphor 
is essentially representational, Metonymy is reductionist, Synecdoche is 
integrative, and Irony is negational” (1973: 34; italics in the original). In other 
13   E.g., Northrop Frye’s famous book Anatomy of Criticism (1957) plays a prominent role in 
White’s work in Metahistory.
14   White later denied that the book has any general theoretical or methodological value—
years after writing it, he claimed its contribution was strictly analytical. White’s opinion 
of his own work notwithstanding, however, there is no reason why one should not build 
upon the fundamental ideas that undergird his study. His work certainly can and has in-
formed historical theory, as I comment below. In any case, he does not seem to mind that 
many historians “have found something useful in [his] book.” See his insightful comments 
in Domańska et al. 1994: esp. 93–94.
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words, while the first three tropes maintain some connection between a real 
past and any present representations of it, Irony undoes this connection. So 
Ranke, for example, thought about the past primarily Metaphorically (White 
1973: 167) and Nietzsche was, obviously, Ironic, even as he attempted to tran-
scend the trope (White 1973: 376). On these kinds of points especially, scholars 
have rightly criticized White for being too schematic and for not sufficiently 
connecting his actual analyses of nineteenth-century works with his theory 
of historical tropes.15 White’s discussion of tropes and historiography, never-
theless, sparked intense discussion among historians and other members of 
the academy in relation to historical preconceptions and representations 
of the past.
Rooted as it was in analyses of specific nineteenth-century historians and 
thinkers, Metahistory’s applicability as containing a general theory of historical 
thought was limited (as White has repeatedly emphasized over the years), but 
it raised important questions about the linguistic and literary nature of histori-
cal work that sent shockwaves through the discipline and though the humani-
ties more generally. Indeed, although White himself eventually abandoned 
the concept of tropes as a theoretical framework,16 he continued to push the 
issue of historical discourse and its fundamentally figurative and literary quali-
ties. In seminal essays such as “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact” (1978: 
81–100), “The Fictions of Factual Representation” (1978: 121–34), and “The Value 
of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality” (1987: 1–25), White tested the 
boundaries between “history” and “literature,” between representations of 
“fact” and of “fiction,” between what is considered “real” and “imagined,” and 
between other discursive concepts generally thought to be somehow opposed 
to one another. He has repeatedly emphasized that the modes of discourse 
15   E.g., Ewa Domańska (1998b: 175) reads Metahistory’s introductory chapter (“The Poetics 
of History,” pp. 1–42), which has caused abundant consternation among historians, as an 
entirely separate work from the rest of the book; and John Nelson (1975: 82–83) states 
that, instead of showing that the linguistic style of a specific work is steeped in, say, 
Irony, White simply argues that the over-arching “attitude” of the work is ironic. Cf. Keith 
Windschuttle (cited in Green and Troup 1999: 207–208), who takes issue with White for 
arguing that “relatively minor stylistic devices” constitute “deep foundations that deter-
mine the whole structure.” White, it seems, took some of these criticisms to heart. In the 
years following Metahistory’s publication he produced a number of essays that sought to 
refine the theory (e.g., 1978: 1–25), though ultimately he distanced himself from it in the 
1980s and later, as I comment below.
16   In his widely read collection of essays The Content of the Form (1987), for instance, he 
mentions the word “tropes” only a single time, on p. 47. Cf. Domańska et al. 1994: 95.
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found in academic historiography are commonly found in other forms of lit-
erature, and that this should inform how we think about and with history.17
How a historical work narrativizes its content—i.e., how it constructs a 
certain kind of story out of historical data—is not unlike how non-historical 
works narrativize their content. Histories are tragic, epic, comedic, romantic, 
and so on; they are thrilling, banal, political, artistic and so forth, in the same 
ways that short stories and novels and even Hollywood films are all of these 
things. The narrativity of a factual account of Napoleon’s France, for instance, 
however constructed, could be precisely the same as the narrativity of a fic-
tional novel focused on the same era. Likewise, a factual narrative construc-
tion of an ancient Near Eastern king’s military exploits could mirror an entirely 
fictional narrative construction of that same king and his accomplishments. In 
terms of narrative, there is little, if any, difference. In drawing parallels between 
fact and fiction, however, White fairly consistently maintains the position that, 
although there are literary and narratival similarities between histories and 
novels for example, the historian and the novelist generally work with different 
sorts of data or—perhaps more accurate—data that is constituted in different 
ways and in different professional contexts (e.g., White 1987: 27; 2014: xiii). It is 
not facts or reality as such that White wants to question vis-à-vis history, but 
the modes of discourse through which past realities are represented as his-
tory. White never questioned the existence of historical facts or the reality of 
the past; he critiqued, strictly speaking, the narrative representations of those 
facts and that reality.
White’s work, nevertheless, grated at the sensibilities of many historians. 
Unsurprisingly, those operating within mainly empiricist frames found White’s 
work untenable, but a number of historians with sympathies for the linguistic 
turn and emerging theory found White’s ideas difficult to accept, too. If history 
and fantasy, for example, are formed out of the same sorts of narrative and 
literary discourses, how does one distinguish between the factual or real past 
and the fictional or fantastical? In Paul Ricoeur’s words, how do we specify 
“the referential moment that distinguishes history from fiction” (2004: 253)? 
White’s insistence on the existence of past realities is one thing, but actually 
discerning those realities vis-à-vis historical discourse is another. The paral-
lels between factual and fictional representations can make it difficult to de-
termine the factuality of any given narrative account once it is constructed.18 
17   For a thorough and excellent account of White’s career and his scholarly contributions 
during it, see Paul 2011.
18   A main flashpoint of debate between White and his detractors on this issue was the 
Holocaust (see, e.g., White 1987: 75–76; Green and Troup 1999: 209–10; Crane 2002: 331–33; 
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This is especially true if there is no data to corroborate the facts, beyond the 
narrative itself, as is often the case with peoples, places, and events described 
in the texts of the Hebrew Bible.
Today, a number of historians working in a variety of fields would agree with 
White’s basic points about the narrativity of historical discourse: i.e., that his-
toriography has much in common with other literary forms; and that these 
forms, historiography included, communicate certain (pre)conceptions of the 
world and reality in it via their modes of emplotment, argumentation, and ide-
ology (cf. Partner 2009: 84–85). But among historians there remains a general 
discomfort with White. Some would argue that, if his ideas are taken up fully, 
they can lead to an absolute relativism that hamstrings one’s attempts to dis-
tinguish between history and fiction, between the real and fantastic, truths and 
lies, and so on. For these historians, White was “a gadfly, an unwelcome critic 
of a hallowed discipline with ancient roots,” as Robert Doran has described the 
situation, and “White’s rapprochement between literary or fictional storytell-
ing and the historical or biographical account amounted to an indictment of 
history as a factual discipline” (in White 2010: xv). But again, White does not 
deny the existence or reality of facts per se, what he calls “singular existential 
statements” (White 1987: 45). Statements like “Napoleon was a French mili-
tary leader” or “Sennacherib was king of Assyria” are verifiable and true, amply 
documented and beyond question. What concerns White is the selection and 
Ricoeur 2004: 254–61; Nichanian 2009: 59–90). In 1991, historian Saul Friedlander con-
vened a conference in Los Angeles, the sole task of which, according to Marc Nichanian 
(2009: 60), was to take White to task on the issue of historical truth, with Nazism and the 
Shoah as a reference point (cf. Friedlander 1992: 2). In addition to Friedlander and White 
himself, a group of internationally renowned scholars gathered to discuss the event and 
its history, its representation and interpretation, and the problems inherent to histori-
cizing genocide. As many scholars have discussed at length, the fact of genocide is an 
aporia: it has happened, does happen, and yet its horrors are irreducible to any definitive 
representation. Nichanian (2009), for example, provocatively states that genocide is “the 
very destruction of the fact, of the notion of fact, of the factuality of fact” (1) in order to 
introduce his penetrating reflection upon the Armenian genocide of 1915, its history and 
testaments to its reality. In writing any history of the horrors of such events and their 
perpetrators, whose very goal is to annihilate the fact of a people’s existence, one con-
fronts the “specter of revisionism” at every turn (Nichanian 2009: 62). The issue is a stark 
reminder of hermeneutical circularity in history. How do politics inform interpretation 
of an event, and vice versa, and how does this political and interpretive interrelation-
ship contribute to the confirmation or constitution of any event’s reality in the past vis-à-
vis the present? Carlo Ginzburg (1992), a participant in the 1991 conference and perhaps 
White’s sharpest detractor there, verged on the claim that White perpetuated fascism. 
And White, in response, called Ginzburg naïve and even hypocritical in his (Ginzburg’s) 
dealings with the problem of representation in historical discourse (in Domańska 1998a: 
16). Today, very few historians, if any, would accuse White of fascism (cf. Paul 2011: 119–24).
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ordering of facts into narrative forms whereby they are read and interpreted as 
historical representations. Thus, he once wrote:
Every mimetic text can be shown to have left something out of the de-
scription of its object or to have put something into it that is inessential 
to what some reader, with more or less authority, will regard as an ad-
equate description. On analysis, every mimesis can be shown to be dis-
torted and can serve, therefore, as an occasion for another description of 
the same phenomenon, one claiming to be more realistic, more “faithful 
to the facts.” 
white 1978: 3; italics in the original
So, it is interpretations, and not facts, that are relativistic in White’s thinking. 
“By separating fact from interpretation,” Doran comments, “Whsite thereby 
steers a middle course between objectivist historicism (there are no interpre-
tations, only facts) and Nietzschean perspectivism (there are no facts, only 
interpretations)” (in White 2010: xxvii). It is his commitment to the middle, 
however, that sometimes proves to be problematic; hence, the challenge of 
representing and interpreting an event like genocide, which as a phenomenon 
is defined by the fact of erasure, and the horrific realities of which are irreduc-
ible to any single perspective or truth.19
In any case, most historians have taken White’s arguments in stride, nod-
ding consent to his general insights about historiography but relying nonethe-
less on disciplinary consensus with regard to historical method and criticism, 
the identification and verification of relevant facts in historical research, and 
so forth. As Ricoeur (2004) points out, White seldom ventures into detailed 
discussions of what Ricoeur calls “the documentary moment and its gener-
ating matrix of presumed truth—that is, the testimony of those who declare 
their having been there where things happened” (254).20 And historians today 
19   In his latest book, White once again comments on the challenge of representing geno-
cide, in an essay entitled “Truth and Circumstance: What (if Anything) Can Properly Be 
Said about the Holocaust?” (2014: 25–39), especially in relation to artistic or aestheticized 
or dramatic representations, such as well known films like Schindler’s List (1993) or La vita 
è bella (Life is Beautiful; 1997).
20   This is perhaps because, as I have emphasized above, White took “the documentary mo-
ment” for granted, never really denying historians’ abilities to establish certain facts. I 
should note here, too, that White worked as a historian throughout much of his career, 
despite claims to the contrary by other historians who wish not to recognize him as a 
fellow practitioner of the discipline (Vann 2009). (A related note: White’s role in scholar-
ship is an ongoing point of debate. In the end, should he be recognized as a historian, 
cultural theorist, literary critic, philosopher, something else? For instance, the American 
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remain reasonably confident in that documentary moment in their work. 
Recognizing the complex epistemological issues at stake here, suffice it to say, 
as Ricoeur (2004) does, that in modern historiography there is an “implicit 
contract between the writer and the reader” based upon the historian’s com-
mitment to cast a critical eye toward evidence and to present accounts of it 
that are “honest and truthful,” and that “more or less approach what one day 
was ‘real’” (261–62). Basing their work first and foremost on critical investiga-
tion of evidence that indicates past realities, historians—as opposed to, say, 
novelists—intend to craft representations that “stand for” the real past, despite 
the affinities between factual and fictional representational discourses.21
Historians who work with the Hebrew Bible as a source intend to do the 
same, of course, to craft reliable representations of ancient Israel and Judah. 
But historians working with the Bible lack essential information about the an-
cient “documentary moments” of the Bible itself. Dealing with a thoroughly 
narrativized source to answer historical questions about these ancient con-
texts, biblical scholars often lack the data necessary to make confident histori-
cal judgments, to craft their own historical narratives of ancient realities. In 
the Bible’s particular case, White’s critiques of historiography and narrative 
representation are incisive, because they force those of us who work in biblical 
studies to reflect upon the narrativity of our primary source, and to find new 
theoretical tools for unpacking and understanding the import of such narrativ-
ity for our historical reconstructions.
For most historians, then, the fruits of White’s labor are the questions he 
raised rather than any specific conclusions he reached (cf. Allan Megill, in 
Domańska 1998a: 6; also Rigney 2013: 186). Today, historiographical work 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, in 1991, inducted him into its “Literary Criticism (includ-
ing Philology)” section [see Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Fall 2016, 
p. 162]. And Paul Roth [2013] has argued that White should be read primarily as a philoso-
pher. White’s career has been truly interdisciplinary, but his work—whether literary-crit-
ical, theoretical, philosophical, or whatever—has always had ties to history and historical 
research.)
21   That said, there is an irony, perhaps paradox, in the fact that history’s “standing for” the 
real past—i.e., the move from documentation to representation—relies upon narrative 
modes of discourse that history shares with non-historical literature, thus forming his-
tory in such a way that is alien to the facts themselves. In its standing for the past, via 
discursive representation, history depicts reality and yet distorts it. On this point, argues 
Ricoeur at least, historians are forced to fall back upon their trust in critical investiga-
tion, in their ability to demonstrate that something has been despite its being no longer. 
“[W]e have nothing better than our memory to assure ourselves of the reality of our 
memories—we have nothing better than testimony and criticism of testimony to accredit 
the historian’s representation of the past” (Ricoeur 2004: 278).
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cannot take for granted the modes of discourse it employs, nor can it carry 
on without acknowledging certain preconceptions about, and the inherent 
challenges to, representing past realities. White’s exhortations for scholars 
to acknowledge and deal with narrativity in history has led to a healthy self- 
reflexivity and even self-criticism, for those with ears to hear (Halttunen 1999). 
Scholars have recognized the “value of narrativity,” to use one of White’s own 
expressions, and in doing so they have also recognized the value of probing and 
challenging narrative coherence and correspondence with the past, in order to 
make room for multiple perspectives and better reasoned interpretations of 
past realities (Rigney 2013: 193–94). The insights and challenges of narrative, 
it seems, are here to stay (cf. Partner 2009: 86–87). Narrative shapes who we 
think we are as individual persons, and as persons interrelated to other indi-
viduals, within society. To cite Ricoeur again, “People have always told stories” 
(in Dowling 2011: 109), and telling stories contributes to the articulation of self 
and social understanding. This articulation, in turn, has been a key impetus 
for the writing of history, and for thinking about the writing of history, in our 
contemporary historical context.
3 Bringing Together Culture and Narrative in History: Social 
Remembering
Thanks in large part to Hayden White, Paul Ricoeur, and their interlocutors, it 
has become clear and unavoidable that the writing of history is wrapped up 
in the narrativity of social life. Moreover, as White’s major arguments became 
prevalent points of discussion in the academy, it became clear that the narra-
tive strategies individuals and groups use to bring the past into the present—
i.e., the means by which people remember the past—were vital talking points 
for historians. Thinking about narrative, then, especially the hows and whys of 
its construction in the processes of historical inquiry, as in the work of White 
and his colleagues, pushed historians to be more self-reflexive, as I outlined 
above, but it also correlated with increased interest in memory and remember-
ing in history. In short, over the years, narrative and memory have established 
a good working relationship, especially in the field of cultural history. Social 
memory, as a social narrativization of the past, has proved to be a productive 
concept for thinking about how meanings have been and are constructed in 
certain historical contexts. For Hebrew Bible studies, the concept can helpfully 
bring together cultural-historical and narratival interests.22
First of all, memory is a cognitive function of the individual mind. It consists 
of the many ways by which the human mind stores and recalls information, 
22   This section is adapted from Wilson 2017: 22–40.
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consciously and unconsciously (Boyer 2009; Landy 2012: 331–36). Humanities 
scholars, in general, have mostly been interested in what cognitive psycholo-
gists call “episodic” memory, that is, how the human mind stores and recalls 
information about specific persons, places, events, and so on.23 According to 
recent research, the mind continuously (re)organizes episodic memories into 
narrative(s), creating an autobiography that helps construct a sense of self and 
a personal identity. From around the age of five years, the constantly evolving 
autobiographical sense of self impacts the ways in which episodic memories 
are stored in the mind, and vice versa: the changing sense of self continuously 
alters the ways through which one constructs, prioritizes, and narrativizes epi-
sodic memories (Boyer 2009: 5–9). Thus, the remembering (and forgetting) of 
life’s phenomena, the ongoing construction of personal narratives out of those 
phenomena, and one’s evolving sense of self all contribute to a cognitive feed-
back loop that continues throughout one’s life, constantly shaping and reshap-
ing one’s memories and personal identity—this is an important point to which 
I return below.
These individual mnemonic processes, however, do not occur in isolation. 
Humans are social beings; we live in society, constantly interacting with other 
individuals. Thus, for at least the last century, scholars have explored the ways 
through which society shapes and reshapes individual memories, how soci-
ety impacts memory, and vice versa (Olick and Robbins 1998; Misztal 2003; 
Williams 2011). Generally speaking, scholars have referred to these processes as 
“social” or “collective” memory. Simply put, social or collective memory is “the 
interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts” (Erll 2010: 2); or, in the 
words of Maurice Halbwachs, it is “a reconstruction of the past [that] adapts 
the image of historical facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present” 
(in Schwartz 2000: 5).24
23   Although cognitivists often distinguish between different types or categories of memory 
(e.g., semantic, episodic, etc.), it is important to note that each of the various types are, 
in some way, dependent upon one another. Semantic memory, which is how our minds 
process a present sensory experience based on prior sensory experiences, helps contrib-
ute to episodic memory and provides the cognitive framework that makes it possible 
(Boyer 2009: 9).
24   Halbwachs saw memory and history as antonyms (cf. Assmann 2011 [German original, 
1992]: 28–31). Today, a reader might question the difference between Halbwachs’s defini-
tion of collective memory and postmodern conceptualizations of history. In the wake of 
the linguistic turn, the concept of memory, in some works, has merged with and even 
become a synonym for the concepts of history and historiography, which flips Halbwachs 
antonymic position on its head. Thus, Klein (2000: 127–50) criticizes this turn to memory 
studies in the discipline of history, especially in cases in which the concept is under theo-
rized. Klein’s criticisms of the use of “memory” are well-taken. However, for at least the 
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One should note, however, that there is no such “thing” as social or collec-
tive memory (Olick and Robbins 1998: 112; Wertsch 2009a: 118–24). There is no 
“mystical group mind”; there are, instead, “sets of mnemonic practices in vari-
ous social sites,” as Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robbins (1998: 112) put it. An indi-
vidual actually has distinct memories; a society does not. This perhaps goes 
without saying, but it is worth mentioning in order to avoid the pitfall of think-
ing about a group’s social memory as a monolithic entity that one can discover 
or reveal by studying said group. In theorizing about social memory, one may 
transfer what we know about the processes of individual cognition to the level 
of society, but only metaphorically and heuristically. Astrid Erll (2010) writes, 
“Societies do not remember literally; but much of what is done to reconstruct 
a shared past bears some resemblance to the processes of individual memory, 
such as the selectivity and perspectivity inherent in the creation of versions of 
the past according to present knowledge and needs” (5). Therefore, in line with 
Olick (2007: 10), it is perhaps more productive to speak of mnemonic practices 
last two decades, there has been a conscious and critical effort to reflect on and refine the 
theoretical and methodological import of social memory as a concept in the study of his-
tory. See, e.g., Confino 1997: 1386–1403; Olick and Robbins 1998: 110–12; and Schwartz 2000: 
9–12. Memory and history can be productive conversation partners, if brought together 
with due attention to their interrelationship. It is important not to collapse the concepts 
of history and memory into one and the same, but neither should one see them as com-
pletely distinct and separate. Consider the thoughts of Hayden White:
    “It is memory, after all, that compels us to confront the enigma of how what is past can 
perdure into the present and, no matter how we might wish it, that refuses to go away on 
command but remains present to consciousness, even getting in the way of perception 
and pressing for attention however distracted we may be by current affairs. Memory, or a 
sense of absent presence, is the basis of a particularly historical consciousness, even if his-
tory has conventionally been presented as a corrective to memory and a more reliable ap-
proach to the study of the past than ‘memorization.’ … History seeks to discipline memory 
by setting up standards regarding what should be remembered and in what manner and 
what form. Thus, history is memory cultivated in the interest of producing a ‘collective’ 
past on the basis of which a collective identity can be forged. In many respects, therefore, 
historical knowledge is disciplined memory, based on some extra-historical criterion of 
what can be legitimately remembered and, indeed, what ought to be remembered and 
what ought to be forgotten by members of the community.” (2010: 320)
    Cf. Barstad 2010. See also the recent and nuanced study of Daniel Pioske (2015b), which 
draws on Ricoeur 2004 and seeks to develop a hermeneutic that situates “referential claims 
of a particular cultural memory within a broader context of ancient referents in order to 
determine if the past represented through it is commensurate with these other material 
and textual traces” (306). Thus, situating the claims of a society’s shared memories within 
a larger complex of interrelated historical data, and analyzing the memories vis-à-vis that 
data, can help us (a) develop a sense of the society’s own epistemology and (b) refine our 
historical reconstructions of that society’s past. Pace Jan Assmann (2011 [1992]), who writes, 
“[M]emory has nothing to do with the study of history” (60).
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and social remembering, whenever possible, to avoid reifying social or collec-
tive memory as an entity.
It is also worth noting that there is no practical way for the historian, es-
pecially one working on antiquity, to separate individual and social processes 
of remembering. (Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists are able, to a 
certain extent, to separate these processes better, but that is because they are 
working with living individuals in the present day.) Just as one cannot reify 
social memory as a monolithic entity, so too one cannot effectively separate 
individual memories from their sociocultural milieu. Individuals remember 
independently, of course, but everyone’s memories are shaped and informed 
by cultural preferences, common narratives, mutual experiences, and so on, 
which are known and shared within social contexts. Any historical investiga-
tion into an individual memory from the past necessarily says something about 
that individual memory’s place within a larger complex of social remember-
ing. The individual remembers, a cognitive function that is socially shaped; the 
society shares certain elements of a past that shapes individual remembering; 
and the individual, as part of the society, acknowledges and legitimizes these 
shared elements of a past by integrating them into his or her memory—the 
processes are contingent upon one another.
With regard to social memory, then, what the historian can do is investigate 
those shared elements in a particular social setting, the lieux de mémoire (“sites 
of memory,” as the phrase is often translated25) of a society, in order to gain 
some insight into how social remembering happens (Nora 1989; Ricoeur 2004: 
401–11; Den Boer 2010). One can explore the lieux on which mnemonic practices 
are focused. Sites of memory help bridge the gap between individual and col-
lective mnemonic processes. These sites are anything that carries a “symbolic 
aura,” whether material or non-material in nature, actual or abstract, which 
is widely circulated and/or experienced in a given society (Nora 1989: 13–14). 
These can be, for example, places (the Coliseum in Rome), events (September 
11 in the United States), persons (Napoleon in France), works of literature (the 
Mahabharata in India), or even a concept or idea (Darwinian evolution in 
the scientific community), among many other things—it is important not to 
25   Nora’s initial use of the term lieux, in the 1970s and 80s, was rather limited in scope: it 
referred especially to ideologically loaded, nationalistic symbols (e.g., propagandistic 
monuments, etc.) that, he argued, could not be value neutral (Den Boer 2010: 21). As the 
term has spread in the academic world, its meaning has become more abstract. This is 
apparent in Nora’s own work. For example, in an essay for a German publication in 2001, 
Nora translates his own term variously, using Herde (centers), Knoten (knots), Kreuzungen 
(crossings), and Bojen (buoys) for lieux, thus suggesting the multiple functions of a simple 
“site” of social memory (Den Boer 2010: 22–23).
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limit “sites” to physical (or even real) places and things. Of course one could 
classify each of these examples in another situational category (in many ways 
Napoleon is both a person and an event). And a site may have different func-
tions in different sociocultural contexts, different time frames, and so forth. 
So, for example, the figure of Napoleon means something different in France 
than he does in Russia, and he meant something different to inhabitants of 
Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than he does to Europeans 
today. This is also true for various subgroups within larger sociocultural mi-
lieux. September 11 obviously has different meanings for the countless identifi-
able geographical, political, religious (the possible adjectives go on) groups in 
North America and throughout today’s globalized world. The most salient sites 
of social memory are often overdetermined (Said 2000). The social matrix that 
informs remembering represents a huge network of cultural signification, and 
the various sites of memory are signified in different ways.
Historians consider social memory and remembering, then, within the 
“symbolic universe available to the society,” within the sociocultural matrix 
that informs and guides group identity and experience (Confino 1997: 1391). 
One might suggest that this symbolic understanding of social memory is 
akin to Geertzian cultural anthropology, which I discussed above. Without a 
doubt, Geertz’s work has had an impact on social memory studies (Erll 2010: 4). 
Memory per se was not a socially systemic conception to which Geertz turned 
his thoughts (though he was certainly concerned with questions of the mind), 
but one can think of the complex of social remembering as a Geertzian cul-
tural system.
Indeed, the historical sociologist Barry Schwartz (2000; 2008) has done just 
that. In his important work on the figure of Abraham Lincoln in American 
social memory, Schwartz convincingly shows how sites of memory function 
systemically in the negotiation of past and present. In particular, he shows how 
various representations of Lincoln (including written and visual) helped re-
flect, program, and frame discourses about leadership, democracy, and national 
unity in twentieth-century America. For instance, in 1963, Lincoln became the 
go-to symbol for thinking about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, helping 
frame the unexpected tragedy of Kennedy’s death. And as a corollary, Lincoln’s 
memory—the grandeur of which had diminished somewhat in the years after 
World War II—received new life via the figure of Kennedy (2008: 221–28). In 
this way, social remembering is dualistic. “The past,” writes Schwartz,
is matched to the present as a model of society and a model for society. 
As a model of society, collective memory reflects past events in terms of 
the needs, interests, fears, and aspirations of the present. As a model for 
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society, collective memory performs two functions: it embodies a tem-
plate that organizes and animates behavior and a frame within which 
people locate and find meaning for their present experience. Collective 
memory affects social reality by reflecting, shaping, and framing it.26 
SCHWARTZ 2000: 18; italics in the original
Thus, when one views a particular image through the frame of memory, one en-
visages that image within its cultural background, within a myriad of symbolic, 
cultural associations that help shape the frame itself. That said, it is important 
to note that this dualistic nature of social remembering is distinguishable only 
from an analytic perspective. In mnemonic practice, both aspects are present 
simultaneously. Schwartz explains,
Memories must express current problems before they can program ways 
to deal with them, for we cannot be oriented by a past in which we fail to 
see ourselves…. On the other hand, the programming and framing func-
tions of memory are what make its reflexive function significant, for we 
have no reason to look for ourselves in a past that does not already orient 
our lives. 
SCHWARTZ 2000: 18–19
So, in 1963, one must have understood Kennedy as somehow evoking Lincoln 
before Lincoln could become a frame for understanding Kennedy; yet for 
Kennedy to evoke Lincoln, one must have already had Lincoln in mind (con-
sciously or unconsciously) as a past figure that could orient thinking about the 
present. In the words of Jeffrey Olick (2007), “[M]nemonic practices express 
neither the past nor the present but the changing interactions between past 
and present: Past meanings are malleable to varying degrees and present cir-
cumstances exploit these potentials more or less” (55–56). The past and the 
present are in constant negotiation, modeling each other in a feedback loop 
that enables sociocultural identification and orientation.
Lincoln is a fantastic example of memory as a cultural system because, as a 
widespread symbolic site of memory whose meaning is contingent upon socio-
cultural and temporal contexts, he became a multivocal and polyvalent figure 
that framed thinking about many different persons and events in American 
society, thus supporting sometimes contradictory ideals. Prior to the Great 
Depression in the United States, for example, Lincoln was symbolized both as 
an everyman and as an unmatched (super)hero, simultaneously embodying 
26   Here Schwartz draws directly on Geertz 1973: 93–94.
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egalitarianism and a strongly defined political hierarchy, and revealing divi-
sions in thought about what America is and what its leadership should be 
(Schwartz 2000: 256–92). This discourse continues even today.27 What one 
finds in Schwartz’s work is a number of narratives about Lincoln, each of 
which contributed unique statements to mnemonic discourse—Lincoln the 
Emancipator, Lincoln the Self-Made Man, Lincoln the Savior of the Union, 
etc.—and each of which provided a model of and for American society in par-
ticular twentieth-century cultural settings.
Understanding social remembering, then, requires an understanding of the 
continuities and discontinuities in various strands of narrative thought shared 
in a society, and how these act and interact as sociocultural models. Memory, 
therefore, in my usage here, is a sociocultural system that helps construe com-
munally shared narratives about the past. These narratives interact with one 
another, reinforcing knowledge of particular episodes and socially shared 
ideas, and forgetting (or: bracketing) others. They are constantly (re)shaping 
the past and its meaning and import for the present and future. Thus, like an 
individual who constantly forges personal identity via the (re)shaping of one’s 
autobiographical narrative, societies continually (re)construct group identity 
via shared narratives about their past, narratives that often complement each 
other but sometimes paradoxically contradict one another. Further, as Olick 
(2007: 27–30) emphasizes, a number of mnemonic practices consciously and 
unconsciously facilitate the processes of social remembering and the (re)shap-
ing of shared narratives and group identity. These include ritual observances, 
visiting and viewing commemorative monuments (and their construction in 
the first place), pilgrimages to ideologically loaded locales, and the production 
and dissemination of authoritative texts and their ideas, among other things.28
27   E.g., Steven Spielberg’s recent Oscar-winning film, Lincoln (2012). The film stirred up much 
discussion about history, politics, and popular film. On November 15, 2012, the Obama ad-
ministration screened the film at the White House for a select group of Congresspersons 
(all Democrats―apparently Republicans were invited, but none attended), bringing the 
film directly into the contemporary political arena.
28   This approach, it is worth noting, is quite different from Jan Assmann’s influential work 
on memory (e.g., 2011 [German original, 1992]; 1997). His work has spawned great aca-
demic interest in what he calls “mnemohistory,” investigating “the history of cultural 
memory”—that is, how a particular subject from the past is treated discursively over long 
periods of time, “over generations and centuries, even millennia, depending on institu-
tionalizations of permanence such as writing, canonization, educational and clerical in-
stitutions, and so forth” (1997: 15–16). Assmann’s work, then, is ultimately an exploration 
of transmission of the past. Moreover, he understands “cultural memory” as transmissive 
in the first place. It is “the handing down of meaning” via significant acts of communi-
cation (2011: 6). So, cultural memory is transmission of the past on a micro-scale, while 
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If the shaping of individual as well as group identity is intricately linked to 
the shaping of narratives about the self or group, then narrative construction— 
where the stories start and end, the ordering of chronology, what is empha-
sized and deemphasized (or left out), the syllogistic reasoning of causation in 
the plots, and the ideological preferences in the narratives—reveals at least 
one essential element in the workings of identity construction. Therefore, as 
one might expect, narrative criticism has been a helpful tool in studies of so-
cial remembering (Wertsch 2009a: 120, 128–32; cf. Fentress and Wickham 1992: 
87–88). Indeed, Schwartz (1998) likens the modeling aspect of social memory, 
the framing of the present with past images, to the emplotment of a historical 
narrative: within a mnemonic system, sites of memory that function as frames 
for the present (and future) define “the meaning of problematic events by de-
picting them as episodes in a narrative that precedes and transcends them” 
(8). Of course, this is also the case for non-problematic events, persons, and 
so on. It is the narrativity of remembering, in any case, that contributes to the 
potential for the production of meaning in social memory.
Here we may return to the work of Hayden White to help us unpack the 
interplay between historical discourse and narrative within the processes of 
social remembering. Embedded in any history’s narrativity, White argues, is a 
mnemohistory is the macro. Now, I should state that Assmann does acknowledge the im-
portance of (essentially) synchronic, socio-mnemonic shaping of individual and group 
identity, processes like those I have outlined above. He calls this “communicative mem-
ory,” and distinguishes it from cultural memory because it lacks the transmissive aspect 
(2011: 6–7, 34–44). However, I find this distinction overly schematic. The lines between 
“the everyday and the festive, the profane and the sacred, the ephemeral and the lasting, 
the particular and the general” (2011: 43), are not so easily drawn. To a certain extent, 
his schema are insightful from an analytic perspective, but the distinctions break down 
in real time. Indeed, everyday experiences shape the experience of ritual festivals, 
and vice versa. It is difficult to untangle them in the complex social processes of signifi-
cation. The same is true for the interrelationship between the mythic (which Assmann 
sees as part of “cultural” memory) and the recent or living (part of his “communicative” 
memory). For example, one thinks of Martin Luther King Jr. giving his famous “I Have a 
Dream” speech before the Lincoln Memorial, a speech that also directly alluded to the 
Gettysburg Address and the Emancipation Proclamation; or King’s stepping into the role 
of Moses in his final public appearance, via the speech “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop.” Is 
King, a figure within living memory in the United States, any less mythic or foundational 
in American culture than Lincoln or Moses? And are any of these figures somehow ex-
cluded from shaping our everyday experiences (our “biographical” memory, in Assmann’s 
term) because they are not properly “communicative” memories? In any case, this is not 
to say that Assmann’s approach is unhelpful for historical study; it can be a rather useful 
schema for thinking about the transmission and reception of certain ideas in sociocultur-
al contexts. For understanding the function of memory in any precise social and historical 
context, however, Assmann’s approach is perhaps less useful.
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discursive statement about historical consciousness, about the meaning and 
import of the past for the present as represented in that history. He states, 
“When the reader recognizes the story being told in a historical narrative as 
a specific kind of story—for example, as an epic, romance, tragedy, comedy, 
or farce—he can be said to have comprehended the meaning produced by the 
discourse. This comprehension is nothing other than the recognition of the 
form of the narrative” (1987: 43; cf. Wilson 2013: 314–15). The form (narrative) 
therefore has content (narrativity), which actualizes the history itself. To get 
at this discourse, as I described above, White emphasizes the means by which 
the history is told: the structure of the plot, the modes of argumentation em-
ployed, and the worldviews embedded in the history. Receiving and thinking 
on a particular history (or any historicizing account), therefore, contributes a 
corresponding discursive statement to one’s memory, and is instrumental in 
the ongoing (re)construction of identity, one’s sense of self and other in a spe-
cific context. And of course all of this feeds back into the production of histori-
cal discourse in a social context.
It is narrative, and specifically the emplotment of narrative—i.e., the nar-
rativity of historical thought—that enables human societies to make sense 
of their places within the progression of time (cf. Ricoeur 1984–1988; 2004). 
Jan Assmann (2010) puts it this way, “Memory enables us to orient ourselves 
in time and to form out of the stuff of time a ‘diachronic identity.’ Political 
myths [i.e., traditional narratives] are about forming a collective or political 
identity, and they achieve this by giving time the form of a narrative structure 
and charging this structure with values, emotions, and ideals” (14). This is true 
for any society, ancient or modern, that has a historical consciousness, as Israel 
and Judah no doubt did. Looking back on the past, one recognizes a narrative 
structure that leads to the telos of the present (or future), and one reads or re-
calls this narrative both “backward” (one has some idea where it is headed) and 
“forward” (one has to piece together the “whys” of the narrative as it unfolds); 
narrative temporality thus has two sides (Ricoeur 1984–1988: 1.45–77; Dowling 
2011: 10; cf. Newsom 2006: 218–19). Put differently, one has a preconceived idea 
of what type of narrative one’s past is (tragic, comic, etc.) and thus of its trajec-
tory over time, yet one also has to figure out how the narrative went from one 
episode to another through time (causality), giving some sense of meaning to 
the process.
According to Ricoeur, anagnorisis (an Aristotelian concept, the aha! mo-
ment in a narrative) occurs when these two perspectives—trajectory and 
causality—converge, when one’s narrative expectation is realized in the un-
folding and interconnected events of the plot. For a narrative to be successful, 
this moment must be persuasive and provide a certain amount of catharsis for 
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the reader (Ricoeur 1984–1988: 1.49–50). “Men in the middest,” writes Frank 
Kermode (2003), “make considerable imaginative investments in coherent pat-
terns which, by the provision of an end, can never be permanently falsified” (17; 
italics in the original). The (re)shaping of social memory and identity occurs 
as groups make these realizations in their shared narratives (cf. Ricoeur 2004: 
80–86): Where and when did we come from? How did we get here now (and 
how will we get to our future)? When and why did that and this happen to us, 
for better or worse? Of course many of the minute details of a narrative, the 
finer points of emplotment, may be chaotic and inexplicable, effecting some 
amount of fluidity in one’s answers to such questions.
Following this line of thinking, I would submit that meaning within social 
memory is first and foremost a function of narrative emplotment, as it is with 
historical discourse. Other narrative elements, such as characterization of im-
portant past persons, certainly contribute to our socially shared interpretations 
of the past, but these elements are at least partially dependent upon emplot-
ment (Jobling 1998: 6–7). This approach to narrative criticism (i.e., reducing 
narrative elements such as characterization to functions of plot) is common 
but not without its critics (Baker 2011: 21–22). While it is true that plot and 
characterization are interdependent, in the case of historical discourse and so-
cial remembering I argue that perception of a past person’s character happens 
secondarily to the perception of telos in the person’s story. In the processes of 
social remembering, what one contributes to the ongoing narrative of society 
is more important than the perception of an individual’s overall “goodness” or 
“badness.” In the end, socially shared narratives and their emplotments tend 
to emphasize certain contributions and outcomes in a person’s life; they en-
courage readers to remember certain details, while forgetting, bracketing, and 
deemphasizing others.
A couple of examples from the Hebrew Bible will be helpful here, as we 
work toward thinking about these issues in relation to biblical studies. First, 
the perception of Samson’s character, for instance, largely depends upon 
whether or not a reader thinks his life is a success, whether or not his narrative 
contributes something positive to Israel’s overarching story, and in what ways 
it does so or does not (see Judges 13–16; Eynikel and Nicklas 2014). As a selfish 
brute with a penchant for foreign women, he certainly is not a “good” Israelite 
in accordance with Torah. Nevertheless, in 1 Samuel, Samuel himself recalls 
Samson as a successful deliverer of the people (1 Sam 12:11; cf. LXX, Peshitta, 
Targums), and the book of Hebrews in the New Testament commends Samson, 
along with Gideon, Barak, Jephthah, David, and Samuel (all less than “good” 
characters in one way or another), as men “who through faith conquered 
kingdoms, administered justice, obtained promises, shut the mouths of lions, 
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quenched raging fire, escaped the edge of the sword, won strength out of weak-
ness, became mighty in war, put foreign armies to flight” (Heb 11:33–34, NRSV). 
Consider Solomon, too. According to 1 Kings 11–12, his life ends tragically and 
his exogamy and idolatry lead directly to the division of Israel. Solomon, how-
ever, was also conceived as a model king, as the one who ultimately fulfilled the 
promise to David by building Yahweh’s temple (cf. 1 Chr 28:5–6). In Chronicles 
the exogamy and idolatry are forgotten, and Solomon stands on par with David 
as a benchmark for Israelite and Judahite kingship and for Yahwistic devotion 
(cf. 2 Chr 30:26; 33:7).29
Present-day discourse provides another good example of the primary im-
portance of emplotment in social remembering. We in North America (and 
abroad) are currently in the ongoing process of remembering the technologi-
cal innovator Steve Jobs, cofounder of Apple Inc., who died in 2011. It is widely 
acknowledged that Jobs was a very difficult person. It seems he was not a very 
likeable character. But this perception of Jobs’s personal character does not 
seem to negatively affect the public’s generally positive view of him as the lead-
ing mind behind Apple and its products. In short, because people think Apple 
turned out great, people think Jobs is great. Journalist Megan Garber puts it 
extremely well:
We tend to recognize people of this caliber, through history’s fuzzy filter, 
not so much for who they were but for what they did. And that pragmatic 
approach to progress tends to reduce greatness, in turn, to binary ques-
tions of person and product. Newton gave us gravity and Einstein gave 
us relativity and Madison gave us representative democracy, and all the 
other details of their lives and their characters tend to erode, in the pub-
lic mind, with the wash of time. Were the Great People of history kind? 
Were they funny? Were they jerks? It doesn’t much matter in retrospect, 
because they—their work—made the world better. The other stuff, the 
human stuff, is inconsequential.30 
garber 2013: n.p.
29   Solomon is, obviously, a complicated case. For instance, Sir 49:4 does not list Solomon 
among the great kings of Judah. Nonetheless, his narrative in Chronicles nicely demon-
strates my point here. On the Davidic promise(s), and its relation to issues of dynasty, 
temple, and Torah, consult Wilson 2017: 131–81 and passim.
30   Garber’s essay is a critique of the biographical film Jobs (2013), which depicts Jobs hero-
ically. A more recent biopic, Steve Jobs (2015), presents the iconic figure in more negative 
light. On the issue of character and reputation in social remembering, see also Olick and 
Robbins 1998: 130–33.
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Of course, retrospection might change as time wears on; if for some reason 
down the road Apple’s technologies are judged to have had a negative effect on 
society, then Jobs’s character will be judged accordingly (a kind of confirma-
tion bias). Within the Hebrew Bible’s narratives, if Solomon were to turn to 
foreign women and idolatry without building the temple, perhaps he, and not 
Jeroboam, would be judged as the great failure and negative ideal. Another 
example: if Josiah were to die mysteriously at the hands of Neco before find-
ing the law book and reforming the cultus, perhaps he would have gone down 
as another Manasseh. At least in these types of discourse, the contribution of 
one’s life to society’s ongoing history, to the trajectory of its plot, ultimately 
trumps one’s characterization.
Social remembering, then, functions primarily within narrative frameworks 
of thought, which have structured plots, inherent understandings of causality, 
and preconceived ideas about social praxis (i.e., ideologies). These narratives 
link together different sites of memory within discourses (e.g., persons, places, 
events), shaping larger sociomental matrices, and contributing to an overarch-
ing mnemonic system, which serves as a model of and a model for society—a 
Geertzian conceptualization of culture. As part of an ongoing, discursive feed-
back loop, social memory (re)shapes understandings of the narratives and, in 
turn, group identity. Such (re)shaping happens via conscious and unconscious 
contestation (what to remember? what to forget?), and via the intrinsic malle-
ability of socially shared stories about the past, present, and future (Olick and 
Robbins 1998: 122–30). Obviously, this complex cultural system and these sorts 
of questions relate directly to history, both as a mode of discourse that address-
es such questions and as an academic discipline that produces the discourse 
itself. Memory and history thus function as narratival conversation partners in 
society, and studying one can reveal the complexity inherent in the other, in 
a given social context. To return to the example of Lincoln, one can probe or 
contest certain narratival aspects of his story (e.g., What exactly drove his de-
sire for the abolition of slavery? Ethics or morals? Economics? Political gain?), 
thus reshaping our understandings of his presidency and its legacy; but the 
story is only malleable to a certain extent (e.g., one could not successfully argue 
that Lincoln was opposed to the U.S. Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment). 
Asking such questions informs a history of Lincoln, Civil War politics and its 
outcomes, but may also provide insights into how society, historians included, 
have remembered him and his accomplishments, in various times and places, 
and for what purposes.
Similar questions may be asked of the Hebrew Bible, especially in relation to 
thinking about the Bible itself as a collection of historical discourses, and how 
its books may have been received as such in antiquity. In other words, are the 
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books now contained in the Bible ancient histories of some kind? What might 
these books tell us about the literary culture and social remembering of the 
Israelites or Judeans who produced and maintained them? And how might one 
go about using these books to write history today? Approaching the issue of 
Lincoln and the political history of the Thirteenth Amendment, for instance, 
scholars stand on relatively solid ground in their historical debates, since 
Lincoln’s era falls within the bounds of our own historical time, during which 
the facts of the past have been amply documented by persons and groups in a 
variety of institutional settings.31 The Bible’s books, though, come from a time 
and place for which documentation—that is, historical evidence—is scarce. 
Moreover, the literary culture in which and by which the books emerged 
was notably different from our own. These books, ancient Judean artifacts 
as it were, contain discourses that are clearly multivocal, and thus are unlike 
typical literary discourses, including histories, today.32 In most narratives, the 
“system of emplotment” (the logic that unites a narrative’s events within a 
temporal framework) works toward a meaningful telos for the reader (Ricoeur 
1984–1988: 1.65–68). Multivocal narratives, like those found in the Bible, how-
ever, often lack a strong sense of ending; they contain extensive instances of 
peripeteia (the falsification of a narrative expectation, another Aristotelian 
concept), which lead to overdetermination (Kermode 2003: 18–22).33 Many of 
the Bible’s narratives, especially in the so-called historical books (e.g., Joshua, 
31   The amendment was ratified in 1865, forty-one years after Ranke published his famous 
dictum concerning what “actually happened” in history. By Lincoln’s time, the modern 
historical condition or “regime” (Hartog 2015) was fully present. The quantity and even 
quality of documentation from the previous two centuries, however, does little to quell 
intense disagreements about particular details of modern history.
32   Diachronically speaking, one can account for the apparent multivocality in the literature 
by positing different compositional hands or stages over long periods of time. There is 
little doubt that the literature is composite, and that it brought together different sources 
and authorial voices in ways that did not always smooth out or reconcile the differences 
(see, e.g., Carr 2011 and Schmid 2012 for comprehensive treatments of the Bible’s compo-
sitional history). This fact, however, does not address the question of how ancient Judean 
readers perceived such discourse, and how their perceptions of it contributed to their 
social remembering of the past, as that past was recounted in the literature itself. For 
an attempt to address this issue at length, and with regard to the concept of kingship in 
Judean discourse, see Wilson 2017.
33   An appropriate literary analogy here is Bakhtin’s well known reading of Dostoevsky. 
Dostoevsky, writes Bakhtin (1984), “brought together ideas and worldviews, which in real 
life were absolutely estranged and deaf to one another, and forced them to quarrel” (91). 
James Wertsch (2009b; 2010) has recently argued, in the same vein, that Bakhtin’s under-
standing of text as dialogical provides a useful heuristic for studying social memory in 
general.
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Judges, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, among others), lack a resolute moment of 
anagnorisis, in the Ricoeurean sense of the term. And in these books, it is even 
sometimes the case that moments of anagnorisis, when they are present, are 
also moments of peripeteia.34
Biblical narratives about the past are overdetermined and consistently man-
age to undermine themselves. These books’ multivocality and their complicat-
ed narrativity thus present significant challenges to any historian attempting to 
use them as sources for the ancient past. How should one handle the Hebrew 
Bible’s accounts of monarchy, for example, which both praise and lament the 
institution of kingship, and how should one think about these texts vis-à-vis 
extra-biblical evidence of Israel’s and Judah’s kings? Or, what to do with a book 
like Joshua, which appears to blatantly contradict its own literary purposes, 
and which recounts events that do not align with what we know about the 
early Iron Age, the period in which those events supposedly occurred? What 
kinds of historical information might such an artifact contain about its an-
cient social and cultural contexts? Below, I argue that the multivocal narra-
tives themselves can be subjects of historical inquiry and can provide valuable 
historical information about ancient Israelite/Judean culture and its concerns, 
regardless of the historicity of the persons and events described therein.35
 Part 2: Hebrew Bible and History
The Bible would make a fascinating historical source, if only we could 
figure out how to use it as such.
fleming 2012: 3
At least two main questions confront scholars interested in the Hebrew Bible 
and history. First, are there texts in the Bible that qualify as history; in other 
words, can we speak of these texts as historical in some way, in their ancient 
context? And second, can we use these texts, today, in combination with other 
sorts of evidence, to compose history; that is, to write about the history of 
ancient Israel and Judah and the peoples with whom they interacted? How 
one answers the first question will, of course, affect how one approaches the 
second. Over the last thirty years or so, among Hebrew Bible scholars, these 
34   The institution of kingship in Israel, as represented in the books of Judges and Samuel, is 
a striking example. See Wilson 2017: 77–130.
35   Special thanks go to my friend and colleague Andrew Tobolowsky, who read a draft of Part 
1 and provided helpful feedback.
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questions have been fuel for heated debates between so-called “minimalists” 
(those who “generally distrust the Bible’s account of Israel’s past”) and so-
called “maximalists” or “non-minimalists” (those who “find value in the Bible’s 
accounts of Israel’s origins and may adopt the Bible’s basic timeline and para-
digms as frameworks for their own history writing endeavors”; Moore 2006: 
1–2). The debates and associated issues are not as simple as this dichotomy 
of labels might initially suggest. These days, moreover, the labels are typically 
used as pejoratives, lacking any real explanatory function. As Megan Bishop 
Moore (2006) has demonstrated, most so-called “maximalist” scholars have in-
corporated “minimalist” ideas into their work (cf. Grabbe 2007: 23–24). Nearly 
all historians of ancient Israel and Judah approach biblical texts with a critical 
eye, seeking to determine if and how any particular text might contribute to an 
understanding of ancient history (although what scholars end up doing with 
any given text varies widely). In the discussion below, therefore, I avoid mak-
ing direct reference to “minimalists” or “maximalists,” the debates of which are 
amply documented and have been discussed at length elsewhere.36 I will, in-
stead, comment on the challenges of these two fundamental questions, focus-
ing on the early Israelite monarchy and historical evidence for it, as a primary 
exemplar, in order to introduce and review some current historical research 
in biblical studies—research that is founded upon these questions but has 
moved beyond the “minimalist/maximalist” debates of previous decades.
1 Is the Hebrew Bible Historical?
Many scholars are comfortable referring to books like Joshua, Judges, Samuel, 
Kings, and Chronicles as ancient history-writing, that is, as generically histo-
riographical books in their ancient contexts. Defining ancient historiography 
as a genre, however, is no easy task (Wilson 2017: 19 n. 33; cf. Barstad 2008: 1–45; 
Pioske 2015a: 8–62). Consider, for example, the following definitions of histori-
ography, with regards to the Hebrew Bible: (1) “narrative that presents a past” 
(Brettler 1995: 12; cf. 2014: 15–16); (2) writings that “purport to be true, or prob-
able, representations of events and relationships in the past” (Halpern 1988: 6); 
(3) ideological articulations of “national identity and the origins of customs 
and norms by which the society is to live” (Van Seters 2009: 353; cf. 1992: 24–42, 
86–99); and (4) “stories containing descriptions of past events in sources used 
for historical reconstruction” (Barstad 2008: 39). The Bible certainly contains 
narratives that describe and represent pasts, and also narratives that articu-
late national identities and social origins. Classical and modern historiography 
36   See, e.g., Moore 2006; Grabbe 2007: 3–36; and Moore and Kelle 2011: 1–42, for accounts of 
the relevant issues and scholarship.
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share these concerns, too. History-writing in general provides readers with ac-
counts of “politically significant happenings in the past” (Pitcher 2009: 11), and 
it is interested in “coming to grips with temporality” (Grethlein 2013: 6)—that 
is, consciously seeking to achieve a re-experience of past time.
Where scholars run into problems is when they try to discern the relation-
ship between such accounts, the data used to construct them, and any autho-
rial intentions behind these constructions. For classical historiography, for 
example, our knowledge is limited, but we do have some idea about how Greek 
and Latin writers constructed accounts and how they theorized about such 
constructions (cf. Pitcher 2009: 14–24). We have no explicit evidence, however, 
for this sort of second-order thinking about historiography in ancient Israel or 
Judah. We must always consider the likelihood of significant differences be-
tween historical epistemology in ancient Israel and Judah, in other ancient lo-
cales, and in our own era (cf. Hendel 2005: 95–107). Daniel Pioske (forthcoming 
2018), for example, whose research I discuss in more detail below, has worked 
toward a more sophisticated understanding of the ancient literary culture that 
produced the texts now contained in the Bible, identifying different modes 
of remembering that would have informed the production of Hebrew prose 
narratives about the past. By examining ancient Hebrew narratives that rep-
resent the early Iron Age (but which were written down later) and consider-
ing them in light of early Iron Age archaeological data, Pioske demonstrates 
how the dynamics of social remembering among ancient Hebrew scribes is 
largely incommensurate with historical epistemology today.37 On account of 
this difference, Pioske is cautious about using the term “historiography” in his 
cultural-historical investigations of ancient Hebrew texts.
Recognizing these significant issues, I nevertheless find the category “histo-
riography” useful for discussing some of the Bible’s literature, especially given 
the fact that our own epistemology of history is widely disputed. Applying 
the tag of “history” or “historiography” to any text, ancient or modern, has 
its generic and philosophical problems. Today, the distinction between, say, 
historiography and historical fiction might be clear enough (keeping in mind 
Ricoeur’s comments on “the documentary moment” and “presumed truth” in 
professional historical discourse, outlined in Part 1), but there is remarkable 
diversity in each of those respective categories. Note, for instance, the differ-
ence between what qualifies as a doctoral dissertation in a university’s history 
department and what is sold under the rubric “history” or “non-fiction” at any 
given bookstore in North America. A doctoral dissertation on the American 
37   My thanks to Dr. Pioske, who kindly shared with me a draft of his forthcoming mono-
graph Memory in a Time of Prose.
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Civil War and a trade paperback covering that same event may both be 
labelled “history” or even “historiography,” but each is held to significantly dif-
ferent standards by its respective readerships.
In any case, the point is that the classificatory boundaries are blurry. Genre 
is never static or monolithic. By claiming, with others, that texts like Samuel or 
Kings are somehow historiographical, I am not excluding the possibility that 
they are also, at least in part, mythic, folkloristic, didactic, poetic, commemora-
tive, and so on (cf. Hendel 2005: 104–105). The title of a recent essay by Rachelle 
Gilmour, “(Hi)story Telling in the Books of Samuel” (2016), nicely illustrates 
this point. Following the insights of Jacques Derrida and others, I reiterate that 
texts do not belong to genres; they participate in generic economies (Wilson 
2017: 223–34). Historians should “read these ancient texts on their own terms … 
taking seriously the textual plurality in which they exist and the multiformity 
found within them individually and between them collectively,” as Raymond 
Person states in a recent contribution (2016: 82). The multivocal and multiform 
nature of the biblical texts makes them unlike modern historiography, which 
typically relies on rigorous evidentiary documentation and is more consistent 
in its generic forms, but the biblical texts are, nonetheless, at least partly his-
toriographical in their representations of the past. They demonstrate an inter-
est in accounting for the community’s supposed real past (as opposed to any 
blatantly non-real past) via prose narrative, and so qualify as a kind of history.38 
Person, for instance, therefore maintains the label “history” for Samuel, Kings, 
Chronicles and the like, but qualifies it as “traditional history”; that is, history 
rooted in a predominantly oral culture, which, in its production of prose nar-
ratives about the past, draws on and preserves a variety of forms and genres 
typically prevalent in cultures predominated by oral story telling. Person’s ap-
proach is similar to Pioske’s in that it recognizes the different cultural dynamics 
at play behind the formations of historiographical narratives in the Bible. The 
epistemological foundations of the Bible’s historiographical texts, then, may 
be more akin to the practices of social remembering than to the documentary 
38   Cf. Brettler 2007: 307–308. In protest, some scholars might mention books like Ruth or 
Esther, which also purport to represent a real past in prose narrative form, but which 
are apparently not historical. Esther, for example, communicates the fact of the Persian 
empire and the Jewish diaspora within it, but its narrative, which abounds with satirical 
humor, making a mockery of Persian rule, is clearly non-historical in its specific details 
(cf. Levenson 1997: 23–27). I would counter by emphasizing, again, that the biblical texts 
belong to no single genre. Esther has the appearance and even some of the elements of 
historiography but is in fact much more comical than historical, while Kings, for instance, 
has more pronounced historical interests and features even as it contains legendary and 
propagandistic elements.
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research of modern historians, but we may still speak of these texts as a sort of 
history-writing in their ancient setting.
2 Can the Hebrew Bible Be a Source for History?
If certain texts in the Hebrew Bible indeed qualify as a kind of history-writing, 
how can we utilize these ancient works to inform our own historical interests 
and endeavors? Take the Israelite monarchy as an example. The biblical texts 
are, of course, largely concerned with the stories of Israel’s and Judah’s kings: 
how the institution of Israelite kingship came to be in the land, how that in-
stitution split into two separate monarchies, and how eventually those mon-
archies were subjugated to and dismantled by Mesopotamian imperial forces. 
The books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings as well as Chronicles recount these 
stories in detail. Prophetic literature, too, addresses the issues of monarchy 
extensively, and kingship is a subject of focus in a number of psalms and in 
some wisdom literature to boot. Accounts of the monarchy, as a key feature 
of Israel’s past, are ubiquitous in the Bible. And the accounts are, in large part, 
generically historiographical, as I stated above, demonstrating an interest in 
representing the real past for the purpose of re-experiencing that past time 
and maintaining a sense of socio-political identification with it (for better or 
worse, from the perspective of those reading these texts in Israel and Judah’s 
postmonarchic era).
Until rather recently, it was commonplace in biblical scholarship to assume 
the basic plotline and details of these accounts as historical facts: Saul was 
the first king of Israel, a Benjaminite who reigned from that territory; he was 
replaced by the Judahite David, who moved the capital south to Jerusalem and 
whose son Solomon oversaw Israel’s becoming a significant power in the re-
gion; the kingdom then split in two after Solomon’s death, with Jerusalem re-
maining as one seat of power and the other seat being established in Samaria 
to the north; and finally the northern kingdom fell to the Assyrian empire 
while the southern kingdom lasted another century-plus before falling to the 
Babylonians. Widely read, and still cited, works by Martin Noth (1958 [German 
original, 1950]) and John Bright (2000 [original, 1959]), for example, more or 
less recapitulate this outline when they come to the Israelite monarchy. Even 
Gösta Ahlström’s more recent historical work (1994), which at its time of pub-
lication was considered provocative, reads for the most part like an overview 
of the biblical accounts.
Concerning David, for example, Ahlström states as matters of fact that 
the Israelite king “began his career at Saul’s court as the king’s armor-bearer 
(1 Sam. 16.14)” (456); that “[a]fter a while David got a Philistine city of his own, 
Ziklag, where he and his entourage could settle (1 Sam. 27.6)” (459); and that 
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“[h]aving secured his position in the Cisjordanian territories and broken the 
Philistine hegemony with their control over the trade route along the coast, 
David turned against his Transjordanian neighbors” (480); among other claims 
about Israel’s favorite king that simply repeat points of plot found in the books 
of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles. In their reconstructions of Israel’s monar-
chic history, these works by Noth, Bright, and Ahlström, to cite just a few 
exemplars, function basically as detailed commentaries on the Bible’s historio-
graphical narratives, with philological and archaeological details supplement-
ing a retelling of the Bible’s main plotline, with only minor tweaks made to the 
stories here and there. This is not to say, however, that these works are lacking 
in historical-critical insight. In many ways, each made seminal contributions 
to historical scholarship of its day. My comments here are meant only to point 
out that, for most of our modern era, the historicity of the Bible’s stories of 
kingship was essentially taken for granted.
But in recent decades historical understanding of the Israelite mon-
archy has changed dramatically. In the 1980s and 90s, several prominent 
archaeologists—Israel Finkelstein chief among them—began revising their 
knowledge of the early Iron Age, the period during which kingship was es-
tablished in ancient Israel, and alongside these archaeologists a number of 
biblical scholars began rethinking their positions on the monarchy’s history 
vis-à-vis its representations in the biblical texts.39 Scholars could no longer 
take for granted the basic plotline and details of the Bible’s narratives concern-
ing the early days of Israelite kingship, as it became more and more apparent 
that Jerusalem and its environs was never the home to a vast and politically 
significant kingdom in the early Iron Age. The fortifications and palatial struc-
tures at places such as Hazor, Megiddo, and Gezer now seem to have been built 
later than the days of Solomon (contra 1 Kgs 9:15), and Jerusalem itself, in that 
same time frame, seems to have been a modest city with little if any connec-
tion to the broader region (cf. Finkelstein 2010). Indeed, the much discussed 
Karnak relief, which commemorates pharaoh Sheshonq I’s campaigns in the 
Levant, does not mention Jerusalem or other major sites in its vicinity (or 
the name Judah or Israel for that matter), suggesting that perhaps this locale 
was relatively insignificant, or at least not a worthy subject of Egyptian pro-
paganda in this instance, in the tenth century BCE.40 All this is not to say that 
39   The number of publications on this topic is truly staggering. For good overviews see, e.g., 
Finkelstein and Mazar 2007; Grabbe 2007: 65–122; Moore and Kelle 2011: 145–265; Noll 
2013: 215–59.
40   That said, prominent Philistine sites also go unmentioned in the relief, which is curious. 
It seems that, for whatever reason, the Philistine centers and the main Judahite sites fell 
outside the purview of Sheshonq’s propagandistic interests on this particular monument. 
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Jerusalem was not home to a monarchic polity of some sort in the early Iron 
Age; the point, rather, is that there probably was no wide-reaching “United 
Monarchy” based in Jerusalem in the tenth century, as the books of Samuel 
and Chronicles claim.
Now, the history of Saul and David and Solomon, that is, of Israel’s early 
monarchy, is largely moot. It has become increasingly difficult to offer any 
kind of detailed account of these rulers’ reigns and their interactions with the 
people of Israel and its neighbors, given what we now know about the sociopo-
litical organization and demographics of the southern Levant in the early Iron 
Age. The biblical narrative, which for most of the modern era was considered 
to be a fairly reliable historical source, these days seems highly suspicious.
Some scholars go so far as stating that these rulers and their kingdoms never 
really existed (e.g., Thompson 1999: 205–207). With Saul and Solomon at least, 
it is true that we have no extra-biblical evidence for their reigns, which com-
plicates any historical claim about them. The same is not the case for David, 
however. In the early 1990s, in the very midst of archaeologists’ and historians’ 
revising the early Iron Age, researchers at Tel Dan unearthed fragments of a 
ninth-century BCE Aramean stele that refers to a “[kin]g of the house of David” 
-At the very least, this find reveals that non-Israelites, specifi 41.([…]ך.ביתדוד)
cally the Arameans to the north, recognized a Davidic polity of some sort, less 
than two centuries after David supposedly lived. It is reasonable, then, to argue 
that at some point prior to the ninth century there was in fact a David who had 
political power in the region. “What we can know about David epigraphically,” 
writes Baruch Halpern (2011), “is that he was thought of as a dynasty founder, 
which in any other ancient Near Eastern context would mean that he was one” 
(213; italics added), a statement with which I agree.42 But this find, in and of 
While Finkelstein and others argue that this is because of Jerusalem’s insignificance at the 
time, some have pushed for the opposite, arguing that Jerusalem was left out because of 
its significance to the Egyptians at that time (e.g., Halpern 2010: 276; Knauf and Guillaume 
2016: 81). But regardless of the reason for it, Jerusalem’s absence on the relief problematiz-
es the biblical accounts that represent this era. See, e.g., Grabbe 2007: 81–83 and Leonard-
Fleckman 2016: 224–31, for further discussion and references.
41   For the editio princeps, see Biran and Naveh 1993 and 1995. There has been some debate 
over Biran and Naveh’s initial reading of the inscription, but I am convinced, with the vast 
majority of scholars, that it is correct. See, e.g., Becking 2011: 16–18 and Leonard-Fleckman 
2016: 215–23, for further discussion and references.
42   If scholars are inclined to defend David’s historicity, it seems to me that the stele provides 
the best approach. Another path is to appeal to David’s characterization in the books of 
Samuel and Kings, especially the texts found in 2 Samuel 9 to 1 Kings 2—the so-called 
“Succession Narrative” or “Court History”—as evidence that he was in fact king of Israel. 
This latter approach makes the claim that, since these texts depict David as thorough-
ly flawed and thus fully human, they must have some basis in historical reality. Julius 
Wellhausen (1957 [German original, 1883]), for example, famously commented that this 
41History and the Hebrew Bible
Brill Research Perspectives in Biblical Interpretation 3.2 (2018) 1–69
itself, cannot adequately support further historical reconstruction of Israel’s 
early monarchy. It is not direct evidence for the king himself or for anything 
that he or his “house” might have done. We are left with a tension between 
the apparent reality of a Davidic polity in the early Iron Age and the appar-
ent unreliability of the Bible’s accounts of this polity’s early era—yet another 
instance of the paradoxical interrelationship of historical fact and representa-
tion, of evidence and documentation of the past and history’s “standing for” 
that past, as I discussed in detail in Part 1.
Scholars’ claims about David and the early monarchy have thus become in-
creasingly cautious in the last twenty to thirty years. Compare, for example, 
Ahlström’s matter-of-fact quote about the beginning of David’s career (above) 
with these statements from Axel Knauf and Philippe Guillaume’s current his-
tory of Israel:
The biographical connection between Saul and David is mostly ficti-
tious…. The stories about David were updated as late as the fourth 
century BCE as part of the continuing conflict between Judeans and 
Benjaminites. David was remodelled into a singer at the court of Saul, a 
person who could not help being successful, and who eventually marries 
the king’s daughter despite the king’s devious machinations…. 
KNAUF AND GUILLAUME 2016: 72
passage stands as an excellent historical account because it “frequently affords us a glance 
into the very heart of events, showing us the natural occasions and human motives which 
gave rise to different actions” (262; cf. Von Rad 1966 [German original, 1944]; Halpern 
2001; Baden 2013; among others). In this line of thought, it is argued that no people would 
ever invent such a flawed national hero (e.g., Baden 2013: 12). There are cases that directly 
contradict this argument, however. Ancient peoples did in fact create rather flawed he-
roes in their legends and foundation stories, even in the ancient Mediterranean and Near 
Eastern worlds. One thinks of the rape of the Sabine women, which is certainly a less than 
flattering depiction of Rome’s legendary founder Romulus and his followers (see Livy, 
Ab urbe condita libri, 1.9; Plutarch, Romulus, 14). And of course there is the most fa-
mous ancient Near Eastern hero of all, Gilgamesh, who, according to the Epic, ruled as a 
tyrant in Uruk and regularly claimed jus primae noctis, leading to his encounter with the 
wild man Enkidu (see I.63–93 and II.103–15 of the Epic’s standard version). Gilgamesh 
clearly had his problems as a ruler, according to the text. Yet on account of his fantastical 
escapades with Enkidu and his subsequent quest for immortality, he was remembered 
and revered for centuries throughout Mesopotamia. Gilgamesh probably was an actual 
king of Uruk in Mesopotamia’s Early Dynastic period (mid third millennium BCE; see 
George 2003: 1.101–19), but his characterization and actions in the Epic do not in any way 
prove this. The same goes for David and his stories. The Tel Dan stele, to my mind, offers a 
stronger (and simpler) argument for David’s historicity as a political leader in the ancient 
southern Levant.
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Given the developments in archaeological knowledge of the early Iron Age 
southern Levant, it is becoming commonplace for scholars to argue that the 
Israelite and Judahite monarchies were never really connected, at least not 
politically, and that the stories of Saul and David—now so intimately inter-
twined in the biblical book of Samuel—had completely separate origins and 
did not come together until centuries after the time when these persons would 
have lived.43 Instead of writing histories that recount David’s beginnings in 
Saul’s court and his eventual ascent to the Israelite throne, more or less reca-
pitulating the biblical plot, scholars are now mainly considering the history of 
David’s (hi)story; that is, how the figure of David was socially remembered in 
antiquity and what the narrative construction of his past life says about the 
later Judahite or Judean literary culture(s) in which and for which the David 
narratives emerged.44
Biblical scholarship has, therefore, largely moved away from detailed inqui-
ries into the political history of the early Iron Age and toward an interest in 
the cultural history of the Bible’s narratives. Why did the narratives take the 
forms that they did, and what sorts of meanings might have been produced in 
the composition and reading of these narratives in antiquity? To be sure, these 
kinds of questions have always been key components to historical-critical bib-
lical scholarship, informing modern histories of Israel’s monarchic era, but now 
they are often the primary object of historical inquiry rather than an interest 
supplementary to larger historiographical goals. In other words, in scholarship 
today, one would be much more likely to encounter, for instance, a historical 
study that explicates Bathsheba’s import in ancient Judean culture—i.e., what 
society in and around the early Second Temple might have made of her story in 
its larger cultural context—than a historical account of her life in David’s court 
in the early Iron Age.
3 The Hebrew Bible as a Source for Cultural History and Social 
Remembering
In the last few years, a number of scholarly works on David have appeared 
that exemplify this shift toward explicating the cultural history of the Hebrew 
43   E.g., Van Seters 2009: 345–48; Blenkinsopp 2013: 36–41; Kratz 2015 (German original, 2013): 
19–21; Wright 2014: 32–35; among others. Compare also the work of Daniel Bodi (2014), 
who argues that Saul and David were seminomadic “tribal chieftains” of their respective 
polities, and that the texts grew out of traditions about conflicts between these chiefs. 
Bodi’s historical reconstruction of these chiefs’ interactions, however, essentially follows 
the biblical story.
44   There is still a contingent of scholarship, however, that maintains the basics of the bibli-
cal storyline in its historical work (e.g., Provan, Long, and Longman 2015).
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Bible’s narratives. Some efforts, like that of Mahri Leonard-Fleckman (2016) for 
example, still set their sights on the history of the early Iron Age, but in doing 
so they take a more sophisticated approach to the biblical material, recogniz-
ing its many disconnects with the sociopolitical realities of that time frame. 
Leonard-Fleckman’s aim is to elucidate our knowledge of the complex rela-
tionship between sociopolitical identities named in the texts of the Bible and 
their historical referents, with “the house of David” being her main interest. 
The phrase occurs in the Tel Dan stele, of course, and throughout the Bible. 
While most of the biblical occurrences refer to the Davidic dynasty in Judah, 
there are several instances that appear to her to function differently (viz. 
2 Sam 3:1; 15:16; 1 Kgs 12:16). According to her research, which also digs into Iron 
Age political nomenclature found in Assyrian texts, these instances refer to a 
kind of political support network, not to an established royal line or geograph-
ic seat of rule, and they represent the earliest understandings of the Davidic 
polity. She emphasizes, too, that these specific instances focus on the struggle 
to rule Israel, making no connections between David’s house and the people of 
Judah per se. Thus, she argues, these texts suggest that David and his “house” 
ruled an “Israel” of the central highlands (apparently separate from Israel to 
the north) in the early Iron Age, and only later did Judahites “bookend” the 
texts with material that linked David with Judah specifically as a polity.45
In her reconstruction, Leonard-Fleckman draws on (unpublished) insights 
from her mentor Daniel Fleming and another of Fleming’s former students, 
Lauren Monroe (Leonard-Fleckman 2016: 7, 141, 170). Fleming and Monroe, 
it seems, while granting that north and south would have been distinct pol-
ities in the early Iron Age (as opposed to a “United Monarchy” as the Bible 
describes it; cf. Fleming 2012: 8–16), argue nonetheless that there was some 
sense of pan-Israelite identity during this period. They therefore describe the 
north as “Greater Israel” and the south as “Little Israel.” This idea runs con-
trary to the thinking of many historians and archaeologists working on these 
issues, who would counter that things went the other way around. In other 
words, according to the counter view, already noted above, Israel and Judah 
were distinct polities and identities in the early Iron Age—i.e., there was no 
sense of connection between north and south—and only later, after the fall of 
Samaria under Assyrian imperialism, did Judah and its “house of David” take 
on any real sense of “Israeliteness.” In any case, here we have an exemplar of 
the biblical texts informing an important historical debate around sociopo-
litical formations in the Iron Age, a debate that will no doubt continue with 
fervor in the years to come. Not all will agree with Leonard-Fleckman’s (and 
45   On the possibilities of textual revisions that bookend earlier material, see Milstein 2016.
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Fleming and Monroe’s) argument concerning the literary history’s relationship 
to early Iron Age politics and identity. But her work provides a good example of 
current scholarship that is concerned more with the sociocultural conditions 
that produced the narrative and its peculiar details, and how those conditions 
relate to broader historical issues, than with the historicity of any events de-
picted in the narrative itself. Her work echoes efforts in the field of history that 
seek to unpack cultural and sociopolitical understandings in literary artifacts, 
and to bring those understandings to bear on other available historical data. 
Compare, for instance, Clifford Geertz’s study of the negara in Bali (1980), and 
other such works noted in Part 1.
Another, similar effort is that of Daniel Pioske (2015a), but Pioske, instead 
of focusing on political nomenclature and identification in the biblical texts, 
examines the Bible’s sense of place and its relationship with history. “Place,” 
wrote Aristotle in his Physics, “does not perish when things in it cease to be” 
(IV.1). Pioske therefore examines the place of Jerusalem in the biblical and ar-
chaeological records, especially as it relates to David and social remembering 
of the king and his seat of rule. The general focus of his work, as discussed 
above, is to improve our understanding of ancient Israelite historical episte-
mology, that is, how Israelites or Judeans thought about their past, in order 
to illuminate our use of the biblical texts in historical inquiry. All too often, as 
Pioske outlines in another piece (2015b), biblical scholars adopt either a naïve 
historicism or an undue skepticism when it comes to the material in the Bible. 
His remedy for this is to develop a stronger framework for understanding how 
ancient historiography “stood for” the past in its indigenous literary culture 
(cf. Ricoeur; see Part 1).
Investigating Iron Age epigraphy and material remains alongside texts in 
Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, Pioske “retraces” Jerusalem’s representations in 
the texts, noting continuities and discontinuities between present knowledge 
of the early Iron Age locale, which he gleans from contemporary epigraphic 
and archaeological research, and the ancient knowledge of it, which he access-
es through the texts. Rather than expending his efforts simply to date certain 
passages of text (e.g., this text seems to line up with this bit of archaeological 
data, ergo the text dates to that particular era), Pioske successfully strives to 
show how ancient composers of the literature wove together different memo-
ries of the city, memories that saw the locale as illustrious and ruined, as vast 
and miniscule, as stable and chaotic—and also how, in doing so, these com-
posers seem to have excluded or forgotten certain details, filling in gaps and 
adapting memories when necessary. This process, he contends, was shaped 
by the history of the city itself. Pioske argues that the narrative accounts read 
and composed by the literati of ancient Jerusalem, in the Iron Age and later 
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in the Persian period, mimicked the locale in which they were written, with 
its long history of ruling and being ruled, of wars won and lost, of peoples and 
institutions come and gone, remembered and forgotten. He demonstrates, for 
example, how narrative representations of geography, of urban social stratifi-
cation, and of literacy in the Judahite capital, in Samuel-Kings, frequently re-
flect realities of the late Iron Age rather than the earlier periods in which the 
narratives situate them (2015a: 107–17). Memories were thus preserved within, 
perpetuated by, and adapted to the contours of the actual place at the time of 
composition. His work on the social remembering of David’s Jerusalem has set 
the stage for a forthcoming monograph, Memory in a Time of Prose, that fur-
ther elucidates our knowledge of ancient knowledge of Israel’s past, and how 
scribes socially constructed that knowledge in their culture.
Alison Joseph’s current work (2015a) is comparable to Pioske’s, in that it 
seeks to improve our understanding of how ancient writers remembered their 
past, but her research is more expressly literary in its focus. Her primary con-
cern is to explicate the cultural poetics of the Deuteronomistic writers of the 
book of Kings.46 She states outright that she does not read the book of Kings 
as a source for history (30). She is, however, doing historical work, in that she 
is recounting the historiographical methods of ancient Judahite scribes as part 
of their literary culture. Her study offers “observation-based criteria for deter-
mining intention [of the biblical writers]” (13), by pointing out what the writ-
ers chose to emphasize and deemphasize, how their selections interact with 
other literary traditions (e.g., prophetic stories), and how the organization of 
their compositions ultimately promotes certain ideologies. The writers of the 
book of Kings, she contends, consistently apply a “Davidic prototype strategy” 
in their remembering of the monarchic past. She writes, “This strategy illus-
trates a grand narrative scheme in which the most important players in history 
are connected, not only in their roles in history and their influence over the 
kingdoms of Israel and Judah, but also in their literary construction” (28). And 
the grand narrative scheme is organized around the notion that David was the 
ideal ruler, the cultic hero whose piety is the religious benchmark to which all 
should be compared. The goal was to do “what is right in the eyes of Yahweh,” 
as David supposedly did.
As Joseph argues in her 2015 book and in another contribution (2015b), 
however, David’s portrayal in Samuel does not live up to the Davidic prototype 
46   Joseph adopts Frank Moore Cross’s position on the Deuteronomistic History and its 
formation, reading an initial composition from the time of Josiah, in the late seventh 
century BCE, and then a subsequent redaction that reflects the Babylonian conquest of 
Jerusalem (2015a: 20–24, 33–37).
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in Kings; that is, even David wasn’t like David. This tension in the texts leads 
her to argue that “[the Deuteronomist] transforms the character of David, so 
well known from Samuel (or Samuel’s sources), into a figure who is program-
matically useful to him in his goal of writing a theologically based, cultically 
focused history” (2015a: 226).47 Her project thus seeks to recount historical de-
velopments in Judahite thought and culture by theorizing about literary his-
tory via close reading of the texts. This kind of approach is not “new” per se; 
indeed, it is the bedrock of modern historical-critical analysis of the Bible. But 
Joseph’s implementation of the classic historical-critical method nonetheless 
builds upon the insights of recent developments in historical inquiry. In her 
discussion of poetics and the import of narrativization, for example, she draws 
directly on Hayden White (2015a: 15–19, 53–58). And although she does not ad-
dress the issue of memory or remembering directly, Joseph’s work is comple-
mentary to the research of Mark Smith (2004) and of her mentor Ron Hendel 
(2005; 2010), both of whom incorporate theories of social memory into their 
tradition-historical analyses of biblical texts.48
The three works just outlined take a diachronic approach to the texts; that 
is, they read the texts as evincing historical development over time, attending 
to the shifts and disjunctures in the texts and attempting to account for such 
shifts by theorizing about compositional history and its relationship to socio-
political and cultural developments in the Levant, in the Iron Age and later. 
Others take a more synchronic approach that is nonetheless historical, in that 
it situates the texts as compositions within a particular time frame, and then 
uses them as a source of knowledge for the sociocultural context responsible 
for the compositions, as it were.
A prime example of a more synchronic approach is Diana Edelman’s 
essay (2013) on the social remembering of David in the late Persian and early 
Hellenistic periods. This is the era during which the books of Samuel and 
Kings, and subsequently Chronicles, likely emerged as works of literature with 
some amount of authority for their Judean readers.49 With David, it has long 
47   John Van Seters (2009), notably, argues basically the opposite about the material in 
Samuel and Kings, that the Deuteronomist’s original, mostly lionizing account of David 
was rewritten in the Persian period to present a more problematic character, transform-
ing the pro-David texts into a complex “saga” about Israel’s most famous king and his 
dynasty.
48   Joseph Blenkinsopp (2013) and Jacob Wright (2014), too, have each produced works that 
are founded upon a classic historical-critical approach to the texts, but which effectively 
incorporate recent insights from memory studies to advance our knowledge of how peo-
ples thought about David as part of their pasts, in the ancient Levant.
49   Edelman takes methodological cues from her colleague and collaborator Ehud Ben Zvi 
(e.g., 2014; 2016a). Cf. also Davies 2008.
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been observed that there are different ideas about his dynasty, its victories 
and failures, its hopes and disappointments, preserved in the books of the 
Hebrew Bible. Again, these books are clearly multivocal. The book of Samuel, 
for instance, promises that the dynasty will be established “forever” (עד עולם; 
2 Sam 7:13, 16) and Kings presents David as the royal benchmark, Israel’s pro-
totypical ruler; and yet the dynasty comes to an end that one might call em-
barrassing, with the last Judahite monarch ironically elevated to a position of 
status in Babylon, not Jerusalem, under the aegis of a less than noteworthy 
Babylonian king (2 Kgs 25:27–30; cf. Wilson 2014). Whereas diachronic ap-
proaches would situate each of these different ideas about David in a specific 
time and theorize about how they came together, a more synchronic approach 
asks what it might have meant for Judean literati to read and promote litera-
ture that juxtaposes these ideas in a certain way, and what such juxtaposition 
might indicate about Judean culture and its understandings of the monarchic 
past. In relation to David and the tangled web of texts and discursive potentials 
associated with him, Edelman argues that—for ancient Judeans reading these 
texts in the context of early Second Temple Jerusalem—remembering David 
as a pious figure who recognized his mistakes, and who remained devoted to 
Yahweh in the face of it all, helped mitigate the problem of the dynasty’s col-
lapse and exile. In this way, David was thought to have been a kind of everyman 
who epitomized a successful life lived before Yahweh, despite one’s victories 
and ultimate failures.50
My own recent work (Wilson 2017), in similar fashion, argues that ancient 
Judeans were able to maintain these diverse and even contradictory memories 
of David, and the various memories of Israelite and Judahite kingship in gen-
eral, on account of prophetic literature’s diverse understandings of the Davidic 
dynasty’s future. In other words, ancient Judean culture allowed for and even 
perpetuated a multivocal discourse on Israel’s monarchic past, especially in 
relation to its foremost king, because it simultaneously imagined a variety of 
possible futures for the institution of monarchy. This kind of work takes up 
the problem of David, the Hebrew Bible, and history from a different angle 
than the diachronically focused works outlined above. Instead of asking how 
the diversity of views in the biblical texts came to be, and what cultural con-
texts might have produced those various views over time, it asks: What does 
the fact of textual diversity in the Hebrew Bible’s books say about the society 
and culture that produced and read such books in antiquity? Each approach 
is valuable, and has furthered our historical knowledge of David, the books of 
50   Compare how Americans have variously remembered Abraham Lincoln in the twentieth 
century (see Schwartz 2000; 2008; discussed in Part 1).
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the Hebrew Bible that speak of him, and the cultures in which and for which 
the ancient texts emerged.
It is a fact, a “singular existential statement” (to use Hayden White’s phras-
ing), that David was recognized as the founder of a polity in the Iron Age 
Levant. It is a fact that Israel and Judah had monarchies. The Tel Dan stele and 
Assyrian records tell us as much, and the Bible does not disagree. Thus our his-
torical explorations of biblical texts along these lines have at least some firm 
ground on which to stand. Scholars like Leonard-Fleckman, Pioske, Joseph, 
and Edelman—each discussed above—have made noteworthy contributions 
to our historical knowledge of the Israelite monarchy, specifically to our knowl-
edge of how the biblical writers narrativized and remembered this institution 
and its most prominent king, David. And, furthermore, this scholarship allows 
us to examine how these later narrative constructions of the past compare to 
the apparent realities of the Davidic polity and its environs in the early Iron 
Age. In this case there is a plethora of historical issues and approaches to such 
issues that the historian may take up. But what about other historiographical 
texts in the Bible whose foundations in ancient historical reality are not so 
firm? What about texts that make seemingly historical claims about obviously 
ahistorical matters? Can we still “do history” with texts describing events and 
persons that have no apparent factual basis? Can we still pursue historical in-
quiries that relate to Joshua’s conquest of Canaan or Ehud’s slaying of Eglon 
the Moabite, to offer a couple of examples? I argue that we can. But our histori-
cal work, in these cases, would not produce accounts of Joshua’s victories or of 
Ehud’s judgeship. The Bible already contains such narrative representations. 
Our work would, instead, interrogate the texts as sources for the cultures in 
which and for which they emerged as literatures, thus strengthening our his-
torical understanding of ancient Israelite or Judean society and life, much like 
recent works on David and the Israelite monarchy have done.
 Part 3: Joshua, a Historical Take
The comprehensive conquest saga in the Book of Joshua is a fictive liter-
ary composition…. Military events that took place in the course of the 
later history of Israel were used by the author as models for his narratives. 
These military episodes were entirely adapted to the new environment 
so that in no case can we trace a direct literary relationship between the 
original story/tradition and its literary reflection. 
naʾaman 1994: 280–81
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What is a historian to do with something like the book of Joshua?51 Although 
there continues to be considerable debate about the book’s history of compo-
sition and related issues, many scholars today, including myself, agree with the 
above statement, from historian Nadav Na⁠ʾaman, that the text is a literary fic-
tion. The book’s narrative may indirectly reflect ancient vestiges of the collapse 
of Levantine urban life during the late Bronze/early Iron Age, as Na⁠ʾaman him-
self and others have argued (cf. Stone 2014), but there was certainly no Israelite 
“conquest of Canaan” as this particular book would have it. The text, then, in 
and of itself, has little value for historical reconstructions of the late Bronze or 
early Iron Age. That said, in this brief exposition, I want to salvage the book 
of Joshua for historical research. The book may be a literary fiction, but it is a 
historical source nonetheless—it is a literary artifact that we can investigate 
for insights into the social remembering of the ancient culture in which and 
for which the book emerged. The book is, therefore, perhaps not very good for 
questions of traditional political history, for which it was frequently used in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, but it may be very fruitful for 
current questions related to the cultural history of ancient Israel and Judah.
In my brief comments here, I do not make any specific historical argument 
per se; instead, I outline some possibilities for using the book in contemporary 
historical research, ultimately promoting an approach that focuses on ques-
tions of social memory, an approach that sees the text’s apparent disjointed-
ness and narrative difficulties as invitations to ask questions about its primary 
ancient readership and their culture. In a recent contribution to the question 
of theology in the Bible, Dalit Rom-Shiloni (2016) makes a statement that is 
helpful, as a starting point: she writes, “The Hebrew Bible demonstrates the 
alertness of different authors (at times relatively synchronic) to diverse literary 
options for describing God … but these authors differ in their perceptions of 
the limits and restrictions that may be applied to the literary portrayal of God” 
(177). This statement applies to most concepts found throughout the Bible’s 
literature. Indeed, if one replaces Rom-Shiloni’s references to God with refer-
ences to Israel’s entry into the land, the statement still rings true. Here it is 
again, but this time in terms of the land: The Hebrew Bible demonstrates the 
alertness of different authors (at times relatively synchronic) to diverse literary 
options for describing Israel’s entry into the land, but these authors differ in 
51   A draft of Part 3 was presented in San Antonio at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the SBL. 
The presentation was part of a special session concerning the book of Joshua and his-
torical research, hosted by the “Current Historiography” program unit. Thanks go to my 
fellow panelists for their keen insights and to those in attendance who provided helpful 
feedback.
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their perceptions of the limits and restrictions that may be applied to the liter-
ary portrayal of Israel’s entry into the land. The interesting thing here, to me, 
is not that the literature contains different perspectives—this goes without 
saying for critics of the Bible. What interests me is that the literature evinces 
a mindset that is alert to these various viewpoints. There are preferences for 
certain points of view, within certain literary limits, but the larger literary con-
text demonstrates a way of thinking that embraced disjointedness and discon-
tinuities in order to form coherent and authoritative discourses, even within 
individual texts like the book of Joshua.
Now, to be sure, others have adopted similar ways of thinking about the lit-
erature of the Hebrew Bible and about the book of Joshua in particular, but 
here I would like to lay out my specific approach to this text and these issues. 
To borrow a term from recent interpretive anthropology and sociology, how 
were “grey zones” (cf. Bonner 2009) created in readings of the text? Where and 
how would textual discontinuities come together to foster potential continu-
ities and coherences, that is, possible meaning-makers for ancient readers of 
this book? And what does this tell us about the culture of the society that pro-
duced, read, and promulgated such literature in the ancient world? What we 
will see is that the text’s ambiguities and ambivalences, the points at which 
the discourse becomes convoluted and the picture fuzzy, are the points that 
would likely foster meaning for its culture. Thus, I take for granted the compos-
ite and somewhat disjointed nature of this text—as would the text’s ancient 
readers—and so, instead of asking how it became composite or what its vari-
ous parts say about different supposed historical authors or eras, I ask what its 
apparent disjointedness might say about the literary culture that received and 
accepted it as such. The kinds of questions that interest me may not be the 
classic historical-critical questions that have been asked of Joshua—e.g., what 
might this text tell us about the emergence of Israel in the ancient Levant—
but they are historical questions nonetheless. I am interested in historical com-
munities and cultures, specifically in the ancient Judeans of the early Second 
Temple era, who, as far as we can tell, were responsible for constructing many 
of the discourses now contained in the Hebrew Bible. And thus I am interested 
in reading the book of Joshua as a source for the cultural history of this society 
and era.
In what follows, then, I would like to comment on several aspects of the 
book of Joshua that I think deserve attention in relation to the approach I have 
sketched here. First, I will briefly comment on the book’s date, textual history, 
and location, since an approach like the one I am advocating is not possible 
without situating the text in a particular place and time. Second, I will com-
ment on the book’s coherence despite its disjointedness, the fact that it holds 
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together as a book despite its discrepant claims about the success of Israel’s 
entry into the land and so on.52 Here, the devil is in the details, so to speak. 
Examining how the book holds together and then where and how its disconti-
nuities fit into and work within its apparent coherence is key for understand-
ing how the book would shape social memory in the early Second Temple era. 
And finally, to give an example of this sort of understanding, I will comment 
on the specific problem of success in the book, on the issue of whether or not 
the land was actually fully conquered and emptied, and how this would relate 
to remembering the figure of Joshua himself as a leader of Israel.
First, to situate the text. I am in agreement with a significant group of schol-
ars who see the book of Joshua as a text that emerged in Israel’s postmonarchic 
era, during the early Second Temple period. There is, to be sure, substantial 
debate concerning the text’s prehistory, its compositional development, how 
different sources might have come together and/or been revised or redacted 
over the course of time, in order to form the book as such.53 But a number of 
scholars—each of whom have very different ideas of the text’s compositional 
history—agree that the book of Joshua emerged in the early Second Temple 
era, as part of or at least closely related to an emergent collection of Judean 
historiographical literature.54 That said, it is important to emphasize, howev-
er briefly, that there were multiple instantiations of this book in that era. We 
know from the Old Greek and from Qumran that different versions of the text 
circulated in antiquity. There are subtle but important differences between the 
Masoretic text and the Septuagint, differences that would effect various un-
derstandings of the book’s interrelationship with other books in the Judean 
corpus—the Septuagint’s version of Joshua, for instance, demonstrates 
closer ties to the book of Judges than does the Masoretic version of Joshua 
(cf. Dozeman 2015: 37–43). Keeping in mind the pluriform nature of this 
text in the ancient world, my comments here will be necessarily broad, cov-
ering only general discursive issues that we can confidently locate across the 
ancient versions.
So, if chronologically the text is early Second Temple, where are we to lo-
cate the text geographically? As scholars often emphasize, the book has a 
kind of “northern” focus. Joshua, the people’s leader, is an Ephraimite. The 
52   On the concept of coherence in relation to biblical texts, see Brettler 2010.
53   On the challenges of dating biblical texts see, e.g., Sommer 2011, who discusses problems 
with connecting dates and meanings, and with the lack of methodological controls for as-
signing dates to particular texts. He aims his critiques primarily at those who date biblical 
texts to later periods, but his concerns are valid for any attempt to date the texts.
54   See, e.g., the Introduction in Dozeman 2015, with detailed discussion and further 
references.
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book presents Shechem and the nearby mountains Ebal and Gerizim—in 
Manassehite territory—as a central place of meeting and worship. Moreover, 
it allows for worship at peripheral sites (e.g., the altar in the Transjordan; 
Josh 22:11–34)55 and has an overall inclusive view of the northern tribes in its 
account of territorial allocation. It also homes in on the liminal territory of 
Benjamin, in the space between north and south, relaying lengthy narratives 
about Jericho, Ai, and Gibeon—locales that either fall within or have close 
ties to that territory. Although Jerusalem and Judah are present in the text, 
the book presents a kind of “pan-Israel” perspective, mostly from a northern 
point of view.
When we talk about the book of Joshua as a literary artifact, then, we are 
talking about a text that represents a particular cultural discourse in ancient 
Israel: that is, it is a postmonarchic text that speaks to issues of worship and 
land, of obedience to Yahweh and how to account for a range of geopolitical 
issues—what land is fully Israel’s and what is not, where is it okay to worship, 
and how did the events unfold that led to these issues in the first place?
In relation to these questions, it is insightful to consider where we find ap-
parent coherences and continuities within the discourse, and where there are 
areas of noticeable disjunction, of discontinuity and tension in that same dis-
course. Here I mention a couple of major examples of continuity that would 
lend themselves to discursive coherence: (1) the recurring theme of Yahweh 
as the people’s divine warrior (e.g., 10:14; 23:10; cf. Nelson 1997: 14); and (2) the 
book’s repeated insistence upon Torah obedience (e.g., 1:7–8; 8:34–35; 22:5; 
23:6; cf. Nelson 1997: 20). Throughout the text Yahweh fights for the people. 
Even though Joshua is appointed as leader, and in some cases he indeed dem-
onstrates his mettle, it is the deity who is ultimately responsible for any victory; 
the text leaves no doubt about this (cf. Wilson 2013: 317–20). Furthermore, the 
deity’s willingness, as it were, to succeed on Israel’s behalf is dependent upon 
the people’s obedience to divine instruction, to Torah.
That said, within this apparently coherent message, where might one find 
tension? Where would the text create “grey zones,” conditions for possible am-
biguity and even aporia in the minds of its readers, in relation to these overarch-
ing and consistent themes? In the book of Joshua there is at least one glaring 
tension: according to some statements in the book, Israel took control of the 
whole land (e.g., 11:23); and yet, according to other claims therein, they did not 
55   Cf. Axel Knauf (2013: 119; also 2014: 83), who argues that, in the early Second Temple era, 
sites outside Jerusalem (e.g., Gerizim, Idumea, Elephantine) were acceptable as long as 
they were understood to be models of the Jerusalem temple. Joshua 22 would have con-
tributed to such an understanding.
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(e.g., 13:1; cf. 23:1–13). In attempts to reduce this tension, scholars have argued 
that any claims of total conquest were not to be taken literally; the claims were, 
instead, part of an ancient literary trope, hyperbolic statements that should be 
taken with a grain of salt. Similar statements of complete conquest are com-
mon in other ancient Near Eastern accounts (cf. Younger 1990: 245–47). In the 
book of Kings, too, for example, there is a comparable juxtaposition of suc-
cess and non-success: in 2 Kgs 24:14 we read that Nebuchadnezzar exiled all of 
Jerusalem, all its leaders and warriors, even though the subsequent narrative 
in 2 Kings indicates that all the city’s leaders were not, in fact, taken away.56 
There is good reason, then, to believe that ancient readers did not take 
Josh 11:23, for instance, too seriously. How could they, given the repeated em-
phasis on Israel’s failure to secure the land? This argument is, however, not 
really a solution to the overarching problem. Even if 11:23 is removed from the 
equation, even if it is written off as literary hyperbole, contradictory claims 
still persist throughout the narrative. With the book of Joshua, we are not deal-
ing with just one or two hyperbolic claims; we have, instead, an entire book 
whose literary framework relies upon the idea that Joshua will fully conquer 
and empty the land. Consider, for instance, the book’s opening lines, in which 
Yahweh himself claims that no one will be able to hinder Joshua’s success. In 
Josh 1:4 the deity even gives specifics about the extent of territory to be con-
quered by Moses’s appointed successor. And yet the book emphasizes that this 
fails to happen. In the book of Joshua, there is a thoroughgoing undecidedness 
about the success of conquest.
As Ovidiu Creangă argues, drawing on contemporary spatial theory,57 the 
tension between the success or non-success of Israel’s entry in to the land 
is a distinctive feature of the book’s narrative. The tension “interrogates the 
central claims of the conquest narrative … but also transforms the binaries 
[of identity] (Israelites versus Canaanites) with which the narrative operates” 
(Creangă 2016: 176; cf. Hawk 2000: xiii and passim). The Canaanites’ remaining 
within the land impacts the land’s ongoing identification with the people of 
Israel. Yahweh’s people do not in fact empty out the land, and thus it is not fully 
theirs, despite Yahweh’s own claim in Joshua 1 that Joshua will successfully lead 
the people to occupy it. The text thus undermines the binary of Israelite and 
Canaanite as distinct identities, as Creangă states and as others have argued, 
56   Cf. Ben Zvi 2016b. Dr. Ben Zvi kindly shared with me a draft of this paper, which is slated 
to appear in a forthcoming monograph, provisionally entitled Social Memory among the 
Literati of Yehud, to be published by De Gruyter.
57   In addition to Creangă’s contribution, see Russell 2016, for an introduction to spatial the-
ory in relation to biblical studies.
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and it also obviously undermines the concept of success itself, with regard to 
Joshua’s mission. This observation is not a new one, of course, but it represents 
precisely the kind of ambiguity or blurred picture in the text that I think gen-
erates interesting historical questions concerning cultural history in ancient 
Israel, specifically concerning social remembering.
These sorts of ambiguities and multivocal statements abound in Judean 
literature, and are ripe for historical investigation concerning Judah’s literary 
culture. The literature’s representation of kingship, for example, discussed in 
Part 2, is an example worth mentioning again. Elsewhere, I have examined the 
many issues related to kingship as a concept in Judah’s social memory, within 
the discursive horizon of the early Second Temple era—a horizon that in-
cluded the emergent Pentateuch as well as the books we now call the Former 
and Latter Prophets (see Wilson 2017). Was dynastic rule a good thing or a bad 
thing? Was the king supposed to be involved in cultic activity or not? Was the 
Davidic line to be renewed in some way, or was it defunct, a relic of a failed mo-
narchic past? The texts offer a variety of perspectives on these issues; they relay 
multiple statements that would have lent themselves to different answers. The 
historiographical literature’s multivocality on these issues, its diverse recollec-
tions of the monarchic past, I argue, would have informed and balanced the 
diverse imaginations of Judah’s future, which we find primarily in prophetic 
literature.
Now, thinking about the book of Joshua in particular and its multivocal rep-
resentation of Israel’s success in fully emptying and occupying the land, what 
can we say about Judean social remembering of these issues? The book gives 
us no firm indication of any precise answer, which in and of itself suggests 
that the postmonarchic Judean readers receiving this literature were comfort-
able with the debate; their mindsets were firmly situated within a framework 
for multivocal discourse about this very issue.58 If we think about Joshua 
vis-à-vis Judges, within the Judean repertoire of historiographical texts, we find 
further support for this suggestion. The two books are closely  interrelated—
some scholars might even say codependent.59 The classic example is, of 
course, the apparent link between Josh 24:28–31 and Judg 2:6–9. And yet the 
books clearly contribute different statements to the discourse on successful 
leadership and conquest of land. They represent different perspectives on the 
questions of kingly versus non-kingly leadership, northern versus southern 
58   Cf. David Jobling’s similar comments with regard to the book of Samuel (1998: 19); and see 
also my discussion of the modeling processes of social memory, in Part 1.
59   E.g., Serge Frolov (2014: 91), who argues that Joshua is not “compositionally well-rounded,” 
and cannot be read as a standalone piece.
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leadership, and centralized versus diasporic worship, to name a few examples. 
The texts are dialogic, juxtaposing viewpoints of certain subjects. Such juxta-
position is not uncommon in Judean literature, and thus tells us something 
about Judean social remembering and historical thought. Take Psalms 105 and 
106, for example, which offer very different but nonetheless complimentary 
takes on Israel’s history, and which were apparently received as such, since—
eventually, though much later—they were set side-by-side in the Psalter (cf. 
Newsom 2006: 223–24). Also, consider the fact that Judean readers maintained 
both Samuel-Kings and Chronicles, and that passages in Isaiah 40–48 juxtapose 
different positions on the question of Israel’s history and Yahweh’s shaping of 
it (cf. Wilson 2016). Judean writers and readers were comfortable embracing 
multiple voices on particular issues. Their literature tells us as much, and we 
should take this seriously in our attempts to understand the cultural history of 
the early Second Temple period.
In a recent essay, Axel Knauf (2014) conducts a thought experiment that 
is helpful for thinking about the book of Joshua along these lines. What if we 
did not have this book? What if only Judges, Samuel, and Kings were extant as 
sequels to the narrative of the Pentateuch? In that case, we might conclude 
that Joshua, Moses’s appointed successor, was thought to be a total failure with 
regard to his military duty, his task of completely emptying out the land for 
the people of Israel. It is only in the book of Joshua itself that there is any no-
tion of Joshua’s success in this regard. Moreover, as I have already emphasized, 
even within the book that bears his name, Joshua’s success is not clear cut. The 
book successfully demonstrates that obedience to Yahweh is key, but it does 
not necessarily demonstrate Joshua’s success in such obedience. In an essay 
that complements Knauf’s contribution (both are contained in the same vol-
ume, Edelman 2014), Serge Frolov (2014) writes, “Joshua plays a central role in 
the Enneatuch’s rhetorical strategy by serving as a primary demonstration that 
YHWH is serious about rewarding observance, above all by granting the people 
of Israel uncontested control of a land of their own …” (95). However, Frolov 
goes on to argue that in the early Second Temple era this rhetoric was ironic. 
The people had not been obedient, but they found themselves living securely 
in their homeland nonetheless. In this way the book of Joshua might actually 
have impeded the authority of the Enneatuch’s message about the necessity 
of obedience.
Why, then, did Judeans keep this book around, and why did they bother to 
integrate it so well into this collection of books? Both Frolov and Knauf sug-
gest reasonable answers to this question. Frolov argues that Joshua provides a 
counter to David: Davidic hopes must have seemed “hopelessly outdated” by 
this time (99), while Joshua would have provided a non-dynastic hero who still 
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did the work of a king (conquest, promulgation of law, etc.); and this narrative 
would have gained further traction post-Alexander (100). Knauf argues that the 
text presents a “theology of the Land” that would fit well in the Persian period: 
the representation of land distribution would have been in conversation with 
the Persian establishment of military fiefs (e.g., Idumea; 80–82). In any case, 
it is clear that Joshua serves as a kind of ballast that, through its multivocal-
ity, brings some stability to the Judean cultural discourses of obedience and 
disobedience, of successes and failures in securing the land, of Yahwistic wor-
ship at the center and on the periphery, and so on. Thus, Thomas Dozeman 
(2015: 42) refers to Joshua as an “intertext” that would help establish linkages 
between different bodies of literature and the various complementary and 
contradictory ideas contained therein.
It seems clear, then, that ancient Judean readers would have embraced the 
multivocality of the book of Joshua, its hedging in relation to Joshua and Israel’s 
success in taking control of the promised land; and that its readership would 
have drawn on a variety of discursive statements in Judean literature which 
were in conversation with the statements contained in Joshua. Moreover, it 
seems clear that the book of Joshua represents a way of Judean thinking, in its 
cultural context, that focused first and foremost on the importance of Torah 
obedience and proper worship in order to ensure Yahweh’s full-fledged sup-
port of the people, and that focused only secondarily on Joshua’s successes as 
a military leader during Israel’s entry into the land. Obedience to Yahweh and 
his Torah is the most coherent element in the text, while the failure of Joshua 
and Israel to empty and fully occupy the land is the most obvious element of 
discontinuity and tension in the discourse. Curiously, Ben Sira and Josephus, 
in later Second Temple-era texts, clearly present Joshua as a great warrior 
and general.60 These texts do not diminish the importance of Torah obedi-
ence, to be sure, but they represent understandings of Joshua’s role that seem 
alien to the book of Joshua itself, in which the memory of Joshua’s overall suc-
cess is fuzzy, blurred, not well defined. This should not be entirely surprising, 
however—as I said at the outset, and as anthropological and sociological re-
search has demonstrated, these “grey zones,” the areas where the text hesitates 
and lends itself to indeterminacy, would function as the most dynamic poten-
tials for creating meaning in the literary culture.
To conclude this final part of the essay, I offer some questions: Why would 
Ben Sira and Josephus contribute to the discourse in the ways that they did? 
60   Cf. Farber 2016: 141–48, 200–22; also Ben Zvi 2016b. Contrast these texts with Pseudo-Philo, 
which portrays Joshua as a “Torah personality” (Farber 2016: 187).
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What were the historical and cultural conditions that made such statements 
possible, vis-à-vis the conditions of the book of Joshua’s discursive contribu-
tions? Some scholars point to the impact of Alexander and a supposed renew-
al of focus on military heroes in the Hellenistic period (e.g., Frolov 2014: 101), 
while others submit that, since stories of military might tend to be very social-
ly salient—i.e., military leadership often functions as an effective socializing 
tool—later writers could not but focus on Joshua as a great victorious hero, 
despite the fact that, in the book of Joshua itself, Yahweh is the real warrior, 
the real hero of the narrative (e.g., Ben Zvi 2016b). To these positions I would 
respond that, first of all, Alexander was certainly not the first military hero 
the region had known, and even though Judah was relatively quiet during the 
Persian period, the Persian Levant was no stranger to military action—Egypt 
was a recurring problem for Persian governance, and of course the Persians 
had to cross through Judah to get there. So I am not so sure that it was only 
in the Hellenistic era that Joshua’s supposed military prowess would become 
salient in Judah’s social remembering. In any case, these are historical ques-
tions that deserve historical answers, and I hope that my comments here have 
demonstrated how reading the book of Joshua can lead to such questions and 
even contribute to their answers.
 Conclusion
Historiography (that is, “history” and “writing”) bears within its own 
name the paradox—almost an oxymoron—of a relation established be-
tween two antinomic terms, between the real and discourse. Its task is 
one of connecting them and, at the point where this link cannot be imag-
ined, of working as if the two were being joined.
de certeau 1988: xxvii
The Hebrew Bible contains an abundance of discourse from ancient Israel and 
Judah. It is, thus, for us, an access point to a real past, to the historical societ-
ies and cultures responsible for its texts. There was a time, not too long ago, 
when scholars basically took for granted the historiographical process of the 
ancient composers of these texts, assuming that the production of these an-
cient discourses relied upon documentary moments not unlike our own, and 
that the composers’ “as ifs” were apparent enough in the literature to afford 
us some access to the persons, peoples, and events described therein. This is 
no longer the case. Developments in archaeology and in our knowledge of the 
sociopolitical realities of the Iron Age Levant have significantly challenged the 
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Bible’s historiographical representations of Israel and Judah. But this is not a 
death knell for historical inquiry in biblical studies. It may no longer be pos-
sible to write a detailed history of David’s rise to power and subsequent reign 
(without simply rehashing the narrative already present in the Bible’s texts), 
but we can write histories that account for how and why the literati of Judah 
wrote about David the way they did, and what potential significance this writ-
ing would have in the literati’s later social and cultural settings. It is, indeed, no 
longer possible to write a history of Israel’s origins in the land that incorporates 
a sequence of conquests led by Joshua (or anyone for that matter), but we can 
write histories that detail the book of Joshua’s import in later Israelite or Judean 
literary culture, relying on the book’s multivocal narrativity to support recon-
structions of literate thought patterns, and situating these apparent patterns in 
relation to the thinking about the past on display in comparable cultural dis-
courses. With the case of David, our own “as ifs” may attempt reconstructions 
of the actual Davidic polity in the Iron Age, an entity for which we have some 
(admittedly scant) extra-biblical evidence. With Joshua, we are better off writ-
ing histories of the (hi)story. But in either case, and in others, the Bible remains 
ripe as a historical source for scholars in the twenty-first century.
In this essay, I have offered a view of how such a source might be cultivated. 
The books of the Hebrew Bible emerged within and for a literary culture in the 
ancient world. Their discourses are sources for this culture; that is, they speak 
to how certain meanings were made and promoted within the ancient soci-
ety that produced and read the texts. Cultural historical approaches that draw 
on the concepts of narrative and social memory, as introduced here, are espe-
cially apposite to biblical studies. “[T]he Bible is a complex collection of his-
torically embedded texts and textually embedded histories which cries out for 
a theoretically sophisticated scrutiny,” once wrote Robert Carroll (1997: 302). 
An interpretive framework built around an attentiveness to the Hebrew Bible’s 
narrativity, and to the possibilities of that narrativity’s interplay with social re-
membering in an ancient Israelite/Judean context, it seems to me, provides 
a means by which to get at those histories embedded in the texts, and even, 
perhaps, to write history with them.
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